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INTRODUCTION 
In debates regarding what sort of policy and legal responses are 
most appropriate in addressing the problem of sex trafficking, it is 
possible to identify two sides:  abolitionists and nonabolitionists.  Ab-
olitionists seek to end both sex trafficking and prostitution generally, 
while nonabolitionists seek to end sex trafficking while allowing pros-
titution to continue.1  The motivational grounding of the abolitionist 
movement is diverse:  some people support abolitionist reforms based 
on conservative or reactionary political commitments, while others 
support abolitionism from a feminist point of view.  An approach to 
sex trafficking that seeks to abolish both sex trafficking and prostitu-
tion generally, as part of a larger set of feminist commitments and 
goals, is typically referred to (and will be referred to below) as “femin-
ist abolitionism.” 
Broadly speaking, feminist abolitionism tends to favor developing 
policy and legal responses to sex trafficking that implement what has 
been coined the “Swedish model.”2  This model includes social-welfare 
policies that assist people in exiting and avoiding prostitution; public 
education campaigns to raise awareness of the harms experienced by 
prostituted people3 and to change social norms that support sex traf-
1 Segregating the two sides into respective camps in these terms is, admittedly, 
somewhat of an oversimplification.  There are, of course, many areas of both actual 
and potential agreement between the sides, and it is possible to develop a more 
nuanced approach that blends aspects of each.  This Article is an attempt to identify 
areas of agreement while providing a detailed explanation and defense of abolitionism.   
2 For a helpful overview of the Swedish model, see Gunilla Ekberg, The Swedish 
Law That Prohibits the Purchase of Sexual Services:  Best Practices for Prevention of Prostitution 
and Trafficking in Human Beings, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1187 (2004). 
3 The choice of terminology here calls for some explanation.  If there is one thing 
abolitionists and nonabolitionists can agree on, it is that the term “prostitute” should 
be avoided, because of its problematic historical use and resulting negative connota-
tions.  Disagreement abounds, however, regarding the best choice of substitute termi-
nology.  Abolitionists tend to favor “prostituted people” while nonabolitionists tend to 
favor “sex worker.”  Indeed, these tendencies are so marked that one can typically 
identify the political leanings of an author based on her choice between these two 
terms.  In what follows, I will use the terms “prostituted people” and “people who sell 
sex” interchangeably to refer to the people with whom prostitute-users engage in sex-
ual acts of prostitution.  I mean for these terms to apply across the whole range of per-
sons so designated, without limitation based on the degree of autonomy exercised by 
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ficking and prostitution; and criminal law reforms that penalize traf-
ficking, pimping, and the purchase of sex, while decriminalizing the 
sale of sex.4 
In general, feminist abolitionism’s recommendations with respect 
to social-welfare provision, education, and criminalizing both traffick-
ing and pimping have been largely uncontroversial.  Similarly, the call 
to decriminalize the sale of sex is relatively uncontroversial, at least 
among feminist reformers.5  However, the abolitionist recommenda-
these people:  the terms are meant to cover both the most enslaved and the most freely 
choosing.  I accept the critique likely to come from nonabolitionists that the term 
“prostituted people” suggests that I mean to limit my considerations to pimped prosti-
tution (and that I am thus wrongly suggesting that all prostitution is pimped).  I do not 
believe that all prostitution is pimped, and I do not intend to limit the term “prosti-
tuted people” to people engaged in pimped-prostitution.  Grammatical awkwardness 
aside, I will assume that a prostituted person may not necessarily be a pimped person.  
I further accept the critique likely to come from abolitionists that the term “people 
who sell sex” suggests an implausibly high degree of autonomy, bordering on the cha-
racterization of these people as “sex workers,” and that a more accurate term would be 
“people who are sold for sex.”  As stated above, I do not mean for my choice of termi-
nology to suggest anything with regard to the degree of autonomy exercised by the 
people with whom prostitute-users engage in sexual acts of prostitution.  If “prostituted 
people” is thought by nonabolitionists to suggest too little autonomy, and if “people 
who sell sex” is thought by abolitionists to suggest too much, then perhaps employing 
both terms interchangeably will achieve a virtuous mean. 
4 As its name suggests, the Swedish model was first implemented in Sweden, see 
Lag om förbud mot köp av sexuella tjänster (Svensk författningssamling [SFS] 
1998:408) (Swed.) [Act Prohibiting the Purchase of Sexual Services] (criminalizing 
users of people who sell sex), although more recently the model has been adopted in 
Norway.  See Ulrikke Moustgaard, Prostitution Legislation at a Turning Point:  Will They Go 
the Same Way?, NIKK MAGASIN, 1.2009, at 24, available at http://www.nikk.uio.no 
/?module=Articles;action=Article.publicShow;ID=891 (discussing the criminalization 
of prostitution in Nordic countries, including Norway’s decision to ban the purchase 
of sexual services beginning in 2009).  South Korea moved toward adopting the Swe-
dish model with two acts passed in 2004.  See Act on the Prevention of Prostitution and 
Protection of Victims Thereof, Statutes of South Korea, Act No. 7212 (Mar. 22, 2004); 
Act on the Punishment of Procuring Prostitution and Associated Acts, Statutes of 
South Korea, Act No. 7196 (Mar. 22, 2004).  Finland prohibits the purchase of sex 
from victims of human trafficking and pandering (i.e., pimping).  Rikoslaki [Penal 
Code], 20:8 (Fin.).  As discussed further below, England and Wales have recently pro-
hibited “[p]aying for sexual services of a prostitute subjected to force, threats . . . or 
any other form of coercion, or . . . deception.”  Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 53A 
(Eng.) (as amended by Policing and Crime Act, 2009, c. 26, § 14 (Eng.)).  A similar 
model is presently being advocated in Illinois by the Chicago Alliance Against Sexual Ex-
ploitation.  See End Demand Illinois, http://www.enddemandillinois.org (last visited Apr. 
15, 2010) (focusing on the harm inflicted on the “women and girls in the sex trade”). 
5 Clearly this reform proposal remains controversial among conservative and reac-
tionary abolitionists who view selling sex as immoral and would prefer to penalize both 
buyers and sellers.  See, e.g., United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 401 (1908) (characte-
rizing “[t]he lives and example of . . . women who for hire . . . offer their bodies to in-
discriminate intercourse with men” as hostile to “reverent morality which is the source 
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tion to criminalize the purchase of sex has been a source of considera-
ble controversy.6 
Some think that the feminist-abolitionist call to criminalize the 
purchase of sex faces insurmountable objections.  Typically these ob-
jections are based on the purported existence of prostituted people 
whose experiences do not fit the feminist abolitionists’ conceptualiza-
tion of commercial sex as violence against women.7  If selling sex is a 
genuinely consensual and valuable experience for some people, the 
argument goes, then feminist abolitionism’s arguments against buying 
sex must fail.8  This Article considers what concessions, if any, feminist 
abolitionism should make in response to this objection and articulates 
two justifications for criminalizing the purchase of sex that are im-
mune to the objection. 
My argument proceeds in four steps.  First, I provide an overview 
of feminist abolitionism, setting out its explanation of why sex traffick-
ing and prostitution are problematic, and distinguishing feminist ab-
olitionism from conservative and reactionary forms of abolitionism.  
Second, I examine two assumptions that underpin feminist abolition-
ism’s account of sex trafficking and prostitution and concede that sell-
ing sex can be a genuinely consensual and valuable choice for some 
of all beneficent progress in social and political improvement”); Shaw v. Dir. of Pub. 
Prosecutions, [1962] A.C. 220 (H.L. 1961) (appeal taken from Eng.) (upholding a 
conviction for advertising the sale of sex as a “conspiracy to corrupt public morals”); 
Roger Scruton, Old Profession, New Toleration:  The State of Prostitution, and the Harm It 
Causes, NAT’L REV., June 19, 2006, at 42, 43 (defending the condemnation of selling 
sex as “not just puritan bigotry” but instead “a recognition of a profound truth” that 
selling sex is tantamount to “abusing the body,” which thereby “harden[s] the soul”). 
6 See, e.g., Janet Halley et al., From the International to the Local in Feminist Legal 
Responses to Rape, Prostitution/Sex Work, and Sex Trafficking:  Four Studies in Contemporary 
Governance Feminism, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 335, 396-98 (2006) (criticizing Sweden’s 
approach to sex trafficking for driving the industry deeper underground, resulting in 
more dangerous conditions for sex workers); Julia O’Connell Davidson, ‘Sleeping with 
the Enemy’?  Some Problems with Feminist Abolitionist Calls to Penalise Those Who Buy 
Commercial Sex, 2 SOC. POL. & SOC’Y 55, 62 (2003) (arguing against the focus on 
reducing demand for prostitution, noting that it aligns feminist groups with unlikely 
allies such as anti-immigration politicians); Teela Sanders & Rosie Campbell, Why Hate 
Men Who Pay for Sex?  Exploring the Shift to ‘Tackling Demand’ in the UK (contending that 
the vilification of men who pay for sex may do more harm than good to those working 
in the sex industry), in DEMANDING SEX:  CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON THE REGULATION 
OF PROSTITUTION 163, 163-64 (Vanessa E. Munro & Marina Della Giusta eds., 2008). 
7 See Halley et al., supra note 6, at 351 (describing the “pro-work” view of prostitu-
tion, which views prostitution as a liberating act that allows a woman to “take[] control 
of her own body”); O’Connell Davidson, supra note 6, at 61 (noting that some people 
who sell sex prefer their mode of employment as a means of making a living). 
8 See O’Connell Davidson, supra note 6, at 61. 
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people.  Third, I outline two arguments that, despite this concession, 
continue to offer robust support for criminalizing the purchase of sex.  
Finally, I examine arguments against criminalizing the purchase of sex 
and consider what, if any, qualifications are required in defending 
feminist abolitionism. 
I.  WHAT IS FEMINIST ABOLITIONISM? 
Since I am offering an argument in defense of feminist abolition-
ism, it seems fitting to start by providing a general account of what I 
understand this label to mean.  Feminist abolitionism, as I understand 
it, is action taken in an effort to end sex trafficking that is motivated 
by a belief that such trafficking harms women in ways tending to sus-
tain and perpetuate patriarchal structural inequalities.9 
It is possible, albeit perhaps less common, to argue in defense of 
abolitionist policies in response to sex trafficking from a Millian liber-
al perspective, by which I mean a political perspective concerned with 
limiting the use of the criminal law to targeting conduct that causes 
9  For a detailed account of what I mean by the term “patriarchal structural in-
equalities,” see MICHELLE MADDEN DEMPSEY, PROSECUTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 147-
53 (2009).  In sum, I use the term “patriarchy” as a placeholder, to represent a particu-
lar kind of wrongful structural inequality against which feminism is concerned to act.  
In Prosecuting Domestic Violence, I analyzed patriarchy in terms of three aspects:  sex dis-
crimination, sexism, and misogyny.  Id. at 139-47.  For further discussion of these ele-
ments, see supra Section I.A.  I do not mean to suggest in this Article that all feminist 
abolitionists endorse my account of patriarchal structural inequality or, relatedly, my 
understanding of feminism as action taken in opposition to patriarchy.  It seems clear, 
however, that some basic commitments do tend to inform feminist-abolitionist 
thought, including (1) the understanding of gender as a social construction, specifical-
ly as a hierarchical structural inequality in which women are subordinated to men; (2) 
the belief that this structural inequality is neither eradicable nor inevitable—that it can 
be dismantled and that realization of a post-patriarchal society is possible; (3) the be-
lief that prostitution is central to the maintenance of patriarchal structural inequality 
and that the institution of prostitution would not exist in its current form or, perhaps, 
not exist at all in a post-patriarchal society; and (4) the belief that working to abolish 
the institution of prostitution is one important means of pursuing the goal of disman-
tling structural inequalities more generally.  Broadly speaking, feminist abolitionism’s 
account of sex inequality and its understanding of the role of prostitution in maintain-
ing sex inequality are influenced by the work of Catharine MacKinnon.  See, e.g., 
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED (1987) [hereinafter MACKINNON, 
FEMINISM UNMODIFIED]; CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF 
THE STATE (1989) [hereinafter MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY]; Catharine A. 
MacKinnon, Prostitution and Civil Rights, 1 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 13 (1993).  For an il-
luminating defense of feminist abolitionism from a radical feminist perspective, see 
Kathy Miriam, Stopping the Traffic in Women:  Power, Agency and Abolition in Feminist De-
bates over Sex-Trafficking, 36 J. SOC. PHIL. 1, 13-14 (2005). 
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harm to others.10  Indeed, in many respects, the two theories of crimi-
nalization I develop below in defense of feminist abolitionism are fully 
consistent with a traditional Millian liberal view regarding the proper 
scope of the criminal law, for both arguments are grounded in the 
premise that buying sex causes harms to others—specifically, to prosti-
tuted people.  The arguments I shall offer are not, therefore, 
grounded in a concern to prevent mere offense or nuisance,11 self-
inflicted harms,12 or harmless wrongdoing.13 
10 There are, of course, many other aspects of Millian liberalism, but the one I re-
fer to here is the famous “harm principle” articulated by John Stuart Mill in his essay, 
On Liberty, in which he declares, “[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others.”  JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 14 ( John Gray 
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1998) (1859).  The most thorough and influential examination 
of the scope of the harm principle (and related principles relevant to limiting the 
scope of the criminal law) remains Joel Feinberg’s four-volume series, The Moral Limits 
of the Criminal Law.  See 1 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:  
HARM TO OTHERS (1984); 2 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW:  
OFFENSE TO OTHERS (1985); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW:  HARM TO SELF (1986); 4 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL 
LAW:  HARMLESS WRONGDOING (1988).  
11 As Feinberg articulated the offense principle,   
It is always a good reason in support of a proposed criminal prohibition that it 
would probably be an effective way of preventing serious offense (as opposed 
to injury or harm) to persons other than the actor, and that it is probably a 
necessary means to that end . . . . 
2 FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 1 (emphasis omitted).  For arguments against criminaliz-
ing offensive conduct, see A.P. SIMESTER & ANDREW VON HIRSCH, Penalising Offensive 
Behaviour:  Constitutive and Mediating Principles, in INCIVILITIES 115, 115-16 (A.P. Sime-
ster & Andrew von Hirsch eds., 2006); A.P. Simester & Andrew von Hirsch, Rethinking 
the Offense Principle, 8 LEGAL THEORY 269, 271 (2002).  The issue of whether mere of-
fense can justify criminalization featured prominently in the famous Wolfenden Re-
port debates in the 1950s regarding the criminalization of prostitution-related activi-
ties.  See REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND PROSTITUTION, 
1957, Cmnd. 247, at 140 para. 249 (Eng.) (“[W]e feel that the right of the normal, de-
cent citizen to go about the streets without affront to his or her sense of decency 
should be the prime consideration . . . .”). 
12 Curiously, Feinberg characterized the harms experienced by prostituted people 
(insofar as they were recognized by him as harms at all) as self-inflicted harms, grouping 
them together with conduct such as “aiding and abetting a suicide, ‘mercy killing,’ 
agreed-upon surgical mutilation, [and] duels.”  3 FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 172.  It is 
not clear to me why any of these examples should be considered cases of self-inflicted 
harm as opposed to cases of harm to others in which the harmed person has (presum-
ably) consented to the harm or risk of harm.  If one were looking for cases of self-
inflicted harms, one would think that examples such as suicide, self-mutilation (“cut-
ting”), or self-starvation might serve as better examples.  Presumably, Feinberg’s un-
derstanding of self-inflicted harms was inspired by his particularly expansive applica-
tion of the volenti maxim (whose name is derived from the Latin phrase volenti non fit 
injuria, which means, “To one who consents, no wrongful harm is done”).  Under 
2010] In Defense of Feminist Abolitionism 1735 
This Article defends a particularly feminist abolitionism by its rec-
ognition of two further points regarding the harm often experienced 
by prostituted people.  The first point is more thinly feminist, while 
the second point adds a more significant feminist character to my ar-
guments.  First, my arguments emphasize the fact that very often pros-
tituted people are women or girls and, further (and here is where the 
feminist element comes in), that women and girls are human beings.  In 
other words, the harm done to prostituted women and girls is “harm 
to others” in the Millian sense:  it is harm to other human beings.14  
Again, this is a rather thin sense of what it means for an otherwise lib-
eral argument to be feminist, but given the long history of women’s 
absence from purportedly liberal theory and political practice, it bears 
noting.15 
Second, my arguments are more robustly feminist insofar as they 
take into account the patriarchal character of the harms at issue.  Spe-
cifically, I recognize that harms often suffered by prostituted people 
are the kind that tend to sustain and perpetuate patriarchal structural 
inequality, that patriarchal structural inequality is wrongful (this is 
where the feminist element comes in16), and that the harms’ tendency 
Feinberg’s interpretation of the volenti maxim, one’s consent not only converts an oth-
erwise wrongful harm into a nonwrong, but actually transforms the consenting subject 
into the agent of the action itself, “transfer[ring] at least part of the responsibility for 
one person’s act to the shoulders of the consenter.”  Id. at 174-76.  
13 It is, of course, possible to construct arguments against the purchase of sex that 
emphasize the sense in which this conduct is wrongful without attending to the fact 
that it is also harmful.  Arguments grounded in the wrongfulness of objectification or 
commodification, for example, need not attend to the question of harm, although they 
frequently elide the distinction between wronging and harming.  For the classic expo-
sition of the wrongfulness of commodification (albeit one that rejects abolitionist re-
forms defended below), see MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996).  
For an argument that selling sex is not wrongful, despite its tendency toward objectifi-
cation and commodification, see MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 276, 
276-78 (1998). 
14 For a discussion of the failure to recognize women and girls as human beings in 
international human rights discourse, see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, ARE WOMEN 
HUMAN? 141-42, 180-82 (2006). 
15 See generally CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 41 (1988) (“In 
contemporary discussions of the state of nature . . . [the fact that human beings are 
sexually differentiated] is usually disregarded.”); JANICE RICHARDSON, THE CLASSIC 
SOCIAL CONTRACTARIANS:  CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES FROM CONTEMPORARY FEMINIST 
PHILOSOPHY AND LAW 11 (2009) (noting women’s traditional exclusion from the 
theoretical frameworks of social contractarians). 
16 It is, of course, possible to agree that the harms often suffered by prostituted 
people are the kind that tend to sustain and perpetuate patriarchal structural inequali-
ty without also taking the feminist view that such structural inequalities are wrongful.  
On that view, one I gratefully take to be uncommon, the tendency of these harms to 
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to sustain and perpetuate structural inequality informs their nature 
and quality.  In other words, my argument is feminist insofar as it con-
tends that a proper account of the nature of the harms in prostitution 
must acknowledge the relationship between these harms and patriar-
chal structural inequality. 
A.  On Patriarchy and Prostitution 
In previous work, and in what follows below, I use the label pa-
triarchy to refer to a wrongful structural inequality that bears explana-
tory force in understanding women’s subordinated social status.17  The 
wrongness of patriarchal structural inequality, as I understand the con-
cept, can be analyzed in terms of its tendency to sustain and perpetuate 
sex discrimination, sexism, and misogyny.18  For lack of space, I will not 
fully revisit my tripartite analysis of patriarchal structural inequality 
here, but will instead illustrate the relationship between the harms of-
ten suffered by prostituted people and these aspects of patriarchy. 
At a high level of generality, all three aspects of patriarchal struc-
tural inequality involve failures to provide women with an adequate 
range of valuable options for pursuing lives conducive to human flou-
rishing.19  Sex discrimination, as I use the term here, involves a failure 
to provide such valuable options based on a misconception of a per-
son’s attributes, needs, or interests, where the failure is based partially 
on the person’s sex.20  Such failures are particularly common in socie-
sustain and perpetuate patriarchal structural inequality might be thought to mitigate 
the wrongfulness of the harms.  So, while the harm may be deemed problematic to the 
extent it caused physical pain or injury, its moral quality would be slightly redeemed by 
the tendency of the harm to keep women in their place.  
17 See DEMPSEY, supra note 9, ch. 7 (providing a philosophical analysis of patriarchy). 
18 Id. at 139-47.  
19 Previously, I characterized the matter more simply, in terms of failures to pro-
vide women with valuable options.  Id. at 140-48.  Here, I note the relevance of “pur-
suing a life conducive to human flourishing” in order to provide a more explicit con-
text for appreciating what makes an option valuable.  I do not intend any significant 
change in meaning; rather, I seek merely to clarify an issue left open in my previous 
work.  Space and scope preclude further development of these ideas here, but suffice it 
to say that my thinking has been influenced by the Aristotelian themes running 
through Professor Nussbaum’s writings on human flourishing and human capacities.  
See generally MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT (2000); 
Martha Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice:  In Defense of Aristotelian 
Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202 (1992). 
20 This account of sex discrimination tracks the work of Timothy Macklem, as re-
fined by Denise Réaume.  See TIMOTHY MACKLEM, BEYOND COMPARISON:  SEX AND 
DISCRIMINATION 11 (2003) (arguing that because of “prevailing misconceptions of 
what it means to be a woman,” women are denied access to opportunities and 
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ties that embrace “‘widespread promulgation of a false or irrelevant 
conception’ of women’s attributes, needs, or interests.”21  The link be-
tween sex discrimination and prostitution can be observed, for exam-
ple, in situations where women and girls of a particular social caste, 
clan, class, race, ethnicity—or those who have suffered a form of 
abuse, typically sexual—are thought to be suited to a life of prostitu-
tion, based on the conditions of their birth or subsequent abuse.22 
Often, however, the failure to provide women with an adequate 
range of valuable options for pursuing lives conducive to human flou-
rishing is based not on any misconception but rather on simply a fail-
ure to value women and girls as human beings.  I refer to such failures 
under the heading of sexism, as distinct from sex discrimination.  Sex-
ism consists in failures to provide women and girls with that to which 
they are entitled—e.g., food, shelter, medical attention, care, educa-
tion, economic resources, and other necessities—based simply on a 
failure to value women and girls as human beings.23  While conditions 
of sexism create a context that is conducive to the proliferation of 
harms to prostituted people, there is also a feedback loop between 
sexism and these harms, for the harms often suffered by prostituted 
people have a tendency to sustain and perpetuate sexist social condi-
tions (i.e., conditions in which women and girls are not valued as hu-
man beings).  Put simply, a world in which women are not valued as 
human beings tends to be a world in which harms to prostituted 
people will be common; a world in which such harms are common 
tends to be one in which women are not valued as human beings.  
Understood accordingly, part of the wrongfulness of the harms suf-
resources that they need to live succesful lives); Denise Réaume, Comparing Theories of 
Sex Discrimination:  The Role of Comparison, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 547, 549 (2005) 
(refining Macklem’s account of what it means “to be a woman” to focus more on 
women’s “attributes, needs, or interests”).  For a more detailed discussion of sex dis-
crimination, see DEMPSEY, supra note 9, at 140-45. 
21 DEMPSEY, supra note 9, at 140 (quoting MACKLEM, supra note 20, at 154; 
Réaume, supra note 20, at 549). 
22 See, e.g., NICHOLAS D. KRISTOF & SHERYL WUDUNN, HALF THE SKY:  TURNING 
OPPRESSION INTO OPPORTUNITY FOR WOMEN WORLDWIDE 3-9 (2009) (discussing the 
phenomenon of intergenerational female prostitution in the Nutt clan near the Nepa-
lese-Indian border); id. at 23-24 (describing the attitude expressed by an officer work-
ing at the Indian border). 
23 See, e.g., Amartya Sen, More than One Hundred Million Women Are Missing, N.Y. 
REV. BOOKS, Dec. 20, 1990, at 61, available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/3408 
(documenting the “missing women” phenomenon, brought about by systematic fail-
ures to provide women and girls with adequate nutrition, shelter, and medical care). 
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fered by prostituted people is the tendency of these harms to sustain 
and perpetuate sexism. 
Finally, no accounting of the harms suffered by prostituted people 
would be complete without regard to the third aspect of patriarchal 
structural inequality:  misogyny.  Unlike sex discrimination and sex-
ism, both of which involve the failure to provide women with valuable 
options either through ignorance or apathy, misogyny entails mali-
ciously choosing to inflict harm based on a hatred of women.  The 
harms often suffered by prostituted women illustrate all too well the 
extent to which misogyny often motivates this violence;24 at the same 
time, these harms have a tendency to sustain and perpetuate misogy-
ny.25  Again, the feedback loop between these harms and patriarchal 
structural inequality informs a proper understanding of the wrongful-
ness of the harm, insofar as part of the wrongness of the harms lies in 
their tendency to sustain and perpetuate misogyny. 
The point of this analysis is simply to explain the sense in which 
the harms at issue in this Article are not adequately understood as 
merely physical or even psychological harms to the individual prosti-
tuted women themselves.26  To be sure, the harms suffered by prosti-
tuted women are often physical, involving injury to the body in the 
form of cuts, bruises, broken bones, and even death;27 moreover, the 
harms are often psychological as well, involving posttraumatic stress, 
24 See, e.g., Sex Professionals of Canada, Bad Client List, http://www.spoc.ca/ 
bad.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (providing extensive records of prostitute-users 
who have raped and violently assaulted prostituted people from 2003–2009). 
25 These feedback loops are established when knowledge of the harms suffered by 
prostituted people becomes known and inspires misogynistic attitudes and actions.  
26 In this regard, the feminist understanding of the harms of prostitution is impor-
tantly distinct from viewing prostitution as a public health issue.  Cf. Eliot Ness, Federal 
Government’s Program in Attacking the Problem of Prostitution, FED. PROBATION, Apr.–June 
1943, at 17, 18 (arguing that curtailing prostitution is necessary for disease prevention). 
27 See Melissa Farley et al., Prostitution & Trafficking in Nine Countries:  An Update on 
Violence and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in PROSTITUTION, TRAFFICKING, AND TRAUMAT-
IC STRESS 33, 33-34 (Melissa Farley ed., 2003) (surveying 854 prostituted women and 
finding that a majority of those surveyed had been subjected to physical violence); 
Ameporn Ratinthorn et al., Trapped in Circle of Threats:  Violence Against Sex Workers in 
Thailand, 30 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 249, 256-66 (2009) (detailing sources 
and categories of violence against prostituted people); Milena Simic & Tim Rhodes, 
Violence, Dignity and HIV Vulnerability:  Street Sex Work in Serbia, 31 SOC. HEALTH & ILL-
NESS 1, 4-9 (2009) (“Street sex workers found themselves caught in a cycle of vi-
olence . . . .”); Cathy Zimmerman et al., The Health of Trafficked Women:  A Survey of 
Women Entering Posttrafficking Services in Europe, 98 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 55, 56-57 (2008) 
(surveying women entering posttrafficking services and finding high rates of physical 
and sexual abuse in trafficking victims). 
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depression, anxiety, and dissociative disorders, among others.28  My 
point is not to deny the seriousness of these harms to individual bodies 
or minds.  Rather, my point is that these harms are not best understood 
from an individualistic point of view:  they are best, or at least better, 
understood from a feminist point of view—one that takes into account 
the tendency of these harms to sustain and perpetuate patriarchal struc-
tural inequality, which subordinates women as a group.29 
Of course, not every reader will embrace a feminist point of view 
on these matters—and so before leaving this analysis, I wish to em-
phasize that the argument below is not strictly dependent on its fe-
minist premises.30  Even if one rejects the connections with patriarchy 
set out above and chooses to understand the harms at issue in merely 
individualistic terms, the argument below still stands.  For the argu-
ment below is, at its core, a harm-based argument.  If the harms at is-
sue, however understood, are serious enough to be worthy of criminal 
prohibition, then they are adequate to motivate the arguments set out 
below.  In other words, there is no need for the reader to agree, even, 
that patriarchy exists, much less care about it as a particular problem.  
One can fully embrace the course of argument below and endorse its 
conclusions simply by agreeing that when human beings are threat-
ened with violence, bruised, beaten, threatened, or otherwise sub-
jected to violence, they are suffering real and serious harms—harms 
that are sufficient to motivate a response by the criminal law. 
B.  Abolitionism’s Strange Bedfellows 
In order to better clarify what feminist abolitionism is, it is worth 
pausing to reflect on what it is not.  Specifically, I wish to examine the 
ways in which feminist abolitionism is importantly distinct from con-
servative and reactionary flavors of abolitionism. 
28 See Melissa Farley & Howard Barkan, Prostitution, Violence, and Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder, 27 WOMEN & HEALTH 37, 44-45 (1998) (examining the prevalence of 
PTSD in a study of San Francisco prostituted-women); see also JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, 
TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 76-84 (1992) (comparing the techniques used to subjugate 
women in prostitution to the experiences of “hostages, political prisoners, and survi-
vors of concentration camps”).  
29 In my account of the harm experienced by prostituted women, therefore, “al-
though the person is kept in view, the touchstone for analysis and outrage is the collec-
tive group called women.”  MACKINNON, FEMINIST THEORY supra note 9, at 40 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
30 To be clear, what I mean by “the feminist premises of the argument” are the pre-
mises set out in this Section, which claim that the harms often experienced by prostituted 
people have a tendency to sustain and perpetuate patriarchal structural inequality. 
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It is an oft-heard complaint that feminist abolitionists have unwise-
ly aligned themselves with conservative or reactionary forces.31  There 
are two versions of this argument, one that questions the wisdom of 
feminist abolitionists jumping into bed, so to speak, with conservative 
and reactionary political allies, and one that impugns the ideological 
basis of feminist abolitionism as mirroring conservative and reactio-
nary accounts of sexual morality.  The former argument, I concede, 
bears some force—albeit not all that its advocates suggest.  The latter 
argument, I contend, is grounded in an implausible distortion of fe-
minist abolitionism and should be rejected. 
In her article, ‘Sleeping with the Enemy’?  Some Problems with Feminist 
Abolitionist Calls to Penalise Those Who Buy Commercial Sex, Julia 
O’Connell Davidson launches the “strange bedfellows” critique of fe-
minist abolitionism.32  Citing examples of feminist abolitionists work-
ing with “police chiefs calling for more extensive police powers and 
tougher sentencing policy, anti-immigration politicians calling for 
tighter border controls, and moral conservatives urging a return to 
‘family values,’” O’Connell Davidson impugns feminist abolitionists 
for forging “alliances with those who would more usually be viewed as 
‘enemies’ of feminism and other progressive social movements.”33  
The gist of O’Connell Davidson’s complaint, in other words, is that 
feminist abolitionists have sold out to those who have an interest in 
sustaining the very sorts of structural inequalities we oppose.  In our 
eagerness to effect legal and political change, the argument goes, we 
have either endorsed policies that are antithetical to feminism more 
generally, or have at the very least lent political support to conserva-
tive and reactionary politicians who endorse such policies. 
I think there is some basis for the “strange bedfellows” critique, 
but it is not as compelling or expansive in its scope as suggested 
31 See generally Jacqueline Berman, The Left, the Right, and the Prostitute:  The Making 
of U.S. Antitrafficking in Persons Policy, 14 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 269, 283-88 (2006) 
(describing the “unlikely” partnership between the Christian right and radical femin-
ists); Melissa Ditmore, Trafficking in Lives:  How Ideology Shapes Policy (arguing that the 
alliance between feminists and political conservatives has led to the passage of 
“dangerous” legislation), in TRAFFICKING AND PROSTITUTION RECONSIDERED 107, 112-
22 (Kamala Kempadoo ed., 2005); O’Connell Davidson, supra note 6, at 59-61 (cau-
tioning against a union between feminists and state actors); Penelope Saunders, Traffic 
Violations:  Determining the Meaning of Violence in Sexual Trafficking Versus Sex Work, 20 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 343, 351-60 (2005) (noting that the antitrafficking agenda 
that results from the union between feminist abolitionists and conservatives is “clearly 
antithetical to the struggle for women’s rights”). 
32 O’Connell Davidson, supra note 6, at 55. 
33 Id.  
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above.  To see why this is so, it is first necessary to separate directly en-
dorsing pernicious policies from working with those who endorse 
such policies.  Clearly, endorsing such policies oneself is worthy of 
criticism.  The form of critique appropriate to such advocacy, howev-
er, is not a “strange bedfellows” critique.  For example, anyone operat-
ing under the banner of feminist abolitionism who frames arguments 
against prostitution based on support for traditional “family values” 
would indeed be worthy of criticism—but on grounds that she has di-
rectly endorsed a pernicious tradition that reinforces patriarchy.  (It 
would, therefore, also raise questions as to whether that person has 
accurately applied the description “feminist” to her advocacy.) 
The “strange bedfellows” critique, in contrast, must be reserved 
for cases in which feminist abolitionists work to achieve policy and le-
gal reform alongside those who seek the same policy and legal re-
forms, but for reasons that are inconsistent with feminism.  That ver-
sion of the critique hits its mark, for certainly feminist abolitionists 
have worked with politicians who endorse a variety of policies that are 
inconsistent with feminist commitments.  Yet, this critique is hardly 
withering to feminist abolitionism, for while it is an unfortunate reality 
of political life that not everyone embraces feminism, it is sometimes 
necessary in order to achieve feminist goals to work with those who re-
ject feminism.34  Given the deep and sustained disagreements regard-
ing values and background reasons that form our political landscape, 
if we waited until everyone agreed on every value and background rea-
son for every policy we hope to secure before making political al-
liances to actually achieve those policy ends, social coordination 
around contentious issues would become impossible.35  Of course, 
34 Accounts of the passage of Title VII, which prohibits employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of, inter alia, sex, speak to this phenomenon.  In its original form, the 
bill did not provide protection from discrimination on the basis of sex.  During debate, 
sex was added to the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination in an effort to defeat 
the bill.  This popular version of events is recounted and queried in Jo Freeman, How 
“Sex” Got into Title VII:  Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. 
163 (1991). 
35 Indeed, the ability to overcome conflicts regarding values and background rea-
sons may contribute to the justification of coalition-based policy creation.  Just as with 
human rights discourse, “part of the value, and hence part of the justification, for 
people having rights in the first place” is that such rights give rise to a “convergence 
consideration,” which in turn “allows us to get beyond our disagreements about the 
(other) values by which those rights-assignments are justified.”  John Gardner, “Simply 
in Virtue of Being Human”:  The Whos and Whys of Human Rights, 2 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 
1, 9-10 (2008).  Despite continuing disagreement regarding background reasons that 
support the policy, agreement as to adoption of a given policy can allow us to make 
some progress on the question of how a particular case should be handled under that 
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there are limits to this coalition-building approach:  sometimes the 
risk of lending an air of legitimacy to bad actors by entering into al-
liance with them is not worth the cost.36  But, as a general critique of 
political maneuvering, the “strange bedfellows” critique packs little 
punch in a landscape of diverse political commitments and urgent 
need for policy reform. 
Second, it is necessary to separate the substantive issues hig-
hlighted by O’Connell Davidson’s critique, for it is not clear that all of 
them are problematic.  The policies under attack include (1) endors-
ing more extensive police powers and tougher sentencing policies; (2) 
endorsing anti-immigration policies; and (3) endorsing traditional 
family values.37  Taking matters in reverse order, I would certainly 
agree that much of what goes under the label “traditional family val-
ues” is inconsistent with feminism and thus any purportedly feminist 
abolitionist who directly endorses such policies should probably turn 
in her membership card at the next meeting.  Moreover, endorsing 
anti-immigration policies strikes me as deeply in conflict with basic 
feminist commitments and thus likely to be inconsistent with feminist 
abolitionism.38 
policy, without having to dredge up the conflicting background reasons that under-
pinned our convergence on the policy in the first place.  
36 Feminist abolitionists, for example, have been split on the wisdom of alliances 
with the Bush Administration, both with regard to the substance of the particular poli-
cies and the risk of lending political legitimacy to an administration that was neither in 
support of feminist aims more broadly nor even consistently abolitionist in its own ac-
tivities.  For an anti-abolitionist account of the alliances between abolitionists and the 
Bush Administration, see Ditmore, supra note 31, at 117-22.  For a critique of Bush-era 
antitrafficking policies in the U.S. Department of Justice, see Michelle Madden 
Dempsey, D.O.J. Model State Anti-Trafficking Statute:  Critique and Revision, in 
PORNOGRAPHY:  DRIVING THE DEMAND IN INTERNATIONAL SEX TRAFFICKING 274 (David E. 
Guinn ed., 2007). 
37 O’Connell Davidson, supra note 6, at 56. 
38 By “basic feminist commitments,” I mean commitments to oppose wrongful 
structural inequalities along multiple intersecting axes, albeit from a point of view par-
ticularly concerned with recognizing and responding to the reasons generated by the 
wrongful structural inequality of patriarchy.  See DEMPSEY, supra note 9, at 135.  There 
may be, of course, anti-immigration arguments that are grounded in a concern with 
avoiding exacerbating existing inequalities.  See, e.g., Research Group on the Global 
Future, Ctr. for Applied Pol’y Research, Brain Drain ( July 20, 2005), http://www.cap-
lmu.de/fgz/statistics/brain-drain.php (objecting to liberalized immigration on 
grounds that “brain-drain” from less developed nations will widen existing inequali-
ties).  If, however, anti-immigration policies are grounded in xenophobia or a belief 
that certain people (“us”) are entitled to more resources and power than others 
(“them”) simply by virtue of national citizenship, then such arguments strike me as in-
consistent with basic feminist commitments.  On immigration policy and social justice 
generally, see PHILLIP COLE, PHILOSOPHIES OF EXCLUSION 1-15 (2000); KEVIN R. 
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With regard to the first issue, however, it is unclear to me why en-
dorsing more extensive police powers and tougher sentencing policies 
is necessarily inconsistent with feminist commitments.  In a society in 
which women are suffering serious harms and where perpetrators are 
granted de facto impunity, a feminist use of the criminal law can 
achieve feminist goals.39  One need only reflect on legal reforms re-
garding domestic violence to see the context in which this alliance 
would not necessarily be inconsistent with feminist goals.40  Of course, 
such reforms run the risk of increasing the power of officials who are 
not committed to the feminist use of that power—but in circums-
tances where the police, prosecutors, and judges (or at least some crit-
ical mass of them) are in fact committed to the feminist use of their 
institutional powers, there is no inconsistency with feminist goals.41 
Leaving the “strange bedfellows” argument to one side, let us con-
sider an argument that impugns feminist abolitionism by claiming 
that its ideological basis mirrors conservative and reactionary accounts 
of sexual morality.  In comparison to the relatively innocuous “strange 
bedfellows” argument above, which merely claims that feminist aboli-
tionists work too closely with conservative and reactionary political 
JOHNSON, OPENING THE FLOODGATES:  WHY AMERICA NEEDS TO RETHINK ITS BORDERS 
AND IMMIGRATION LAWS 18-26 (2007).  For an argument in favor of liberalizing immi-
gration laws to address trafficking, see Karen E. Bravo, Free Labor!  A Labor Liberalization 
Solution to Modern Trafficking in Humans, 18 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 545, 
571-73 (2009). 
39 This is not to say that it necessarily will—but simply that it might very well be 
worth a try.  For an optimistic account of this possibility in the context of domestic vi-
olence prosecution, see DEMPSEY, supra note 9.  For a compelling examination of the 
ways in which the criminal law and perhaps even appeals to state power more general-
ly, have been in tension with feminist antiviolence goals, see KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN 
ABUSIVE STATE:  HOW NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIATED THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT 
AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE ch. 4 (2008).  Still, while all of these works underscore the 
risk of backlash and the importance of feminists working outside existing state institu-
tions and legal systems, they do not justify the conclusion that working inside (as well) 
is necessarily inconsistent with achieving feminist goals. 
40 For example, reforms that permit police to arrest for domestic violence offenses 
without personally observing the offenses and sentencing policies that mandate court 
supervision in domestic violence cases are both expansions of the state’s criminaliza-
tion powers that are not necessarily inconsistent with feminist goals.  For a review of 
these developments, see Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 
1970–1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 53-65 (1992).  The backlash effect of 
many domestic violence reforms in the criminal justice system, while introducing a 
healthy dose of skepticism and caution, was not a necessary effect of these reforms.  
41 In “strange bedfellows” critiques that target feminist abolitionists’ associations 
with law enforcement officials, there is often a hint that the categories of “law en-
forcement official” and “feminist” are mutually exclusive.  As I hope to have demon-
strated in previous work, they are not.  See, e.g., DEMPSEY, supra note 9. 
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forces, the ideological argument is that feminist abolitionists actually 
agree with conservatives on fundamental ideological issues.  Penelope 
Saunders offers a version of this argument when she claims that 
“[a]bolitionist feminists tap into widely held beliefs about the harms 
women face due to their sexual vulnerability.  This is the ideological 
element that connects conservative and abolitionist feminist agendas.”42 
This critique rests on an invalid distortion of the basic commit-
ments underpinning feminist abolitionism.  It fails to acknowledge the 
extent to which conservative or reactionary abolitionism’s fundamen-
tal understanding of why prostitution is problematic differs from fe-
minist abolitionism’s understanding.  Conservative and reactionary 
abolitionists tend to view the wrongness of prostitution in religious 
terms, which focus on the sanctity of human sexuality as expressed 
within the confines of heterosexual monogamous marriage and judge 
all other forms of sexual activity—such as adultery, prostitution, ho-
mosexual sex, and masturbation—as worthy of condemnation.43  
Moreover, women’s sexual vulnerability is viewed as natural and prop-
er rather than a problematic symptom of wrongful patriarchal struc-
tural inequality.  From this perspective, sex trafficking is considered 
wrong for the same kinds of reasons that any sexual activity outside 
the confines of heterosexual, monogamous marriage is considered 
wrong. 
Conservative abolitionists seek to abolish the commercial sex in-
dustry because it transforms existing social forms that they would ra-
ther wish to conserve:  namely, traditional heterosexual patriarchal 
marriage and family.44  To conservative abolitionists, traditional social 
forms are under threat.  In response, they seek to shore up traditional 
values by abolishing social institutions they view as threatening.  Reac-
42 Saunders, supra note 31, at 355.  
43 For a particularly stark contrast between conservative and reactionary abolition-
ism and feminist abolitionism, consider the following from the website Christ Is the 
Only Way to Heaven!, www.jesus-is-savior.com (last visited Apr. 15, 2010):  Pages on the 
site call for the abolition of prostitution as a particularly objectionable form of fornica-
tion.  See Prostitution Is Wicked!, http://www.jesus-is-savior.com/Evils%20in%20America 
/prostitution_is_wicked.htm, (last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“Marriage is honourable in all, 
and the bed undefiled:  but whoremongers and adulterers God will judge.” (quoting He-
brews 13:4)).  At the same time it condemns feminism—even feminist theology—as “di-
abolical.”  Feminist Theology?, http://www.jesus-is-savior.com/Evils%20in%20America 
/Feminism/feminist_theology.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2010). 
44 The phrase “social form” is borrowed from the writings of Joseph Raz.  See JO-
SEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 307-13 (1986) (defining “social forms” as “forms 
of behavior which are in fact widely practised in . . . society”).  For a detailed discussion 
of social forms, see DEMPSEY, supra note 9, at 137-39. 
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tionary abolitionism, in comparison, views the social forms of tradi-
tional heterosexual patriarchal marriage and family as already having 
been more or less transformed.  In response to this transformation, 
reactionaries seek to abolish prostitution to reestablish or reentrench 
traditional heterosexual patriarchal marriage and family. 
For feminist abolitionists, however, prostitution is wrong because 
it so often harms women, both individually and by virtue of its ten-
dency to sustain and perpetuate patriarchal structural inequality.45  
This focus is central to the feminist understanding of why prostitution 
is deeply problematic and thus a fitting target for abolition.  While the 
harms women face are central to feminist abolitionism’s understand-
ing of prostitution, they are secondary—if present at all—in the con-
servative and reactionary understanding of why prostitution is wrong.46 
Of course, conservative and reactionary theories of abolitionism 
need not be religiously grounded (folks can endorse traditional pa-
triarchal social forms without believing that God agrees with them) 
and, mutatis mutandis, feminist abolitionism need not be devoid of re-
ligious premises (folks can critique traditional patriarchal social forms 
and believe that God agrees with them).  The key distinction is simply 
the respective understanding of why sex trafficking and prostitution 
should be abolished:  feminists support abolitionism as a means to 
challenge and ultimately dismantle patriarchal structural inequality, 
while conservatives and reactionaries support abolitionism as a means 
to maintain or reestablish patriarchal structural inequality.  On this 
key ideological element, therefore, conservative and feminist abolition-
ism are not connected at all; instead, they are diametrically opposed.47 
45 See supra Sections I.A. and I.B. 
46 It is possible for conservative and reactionary abolitionist accounts to borrow 
the language of harm to articulate their claims.  In this regard, Bernard Harcourt ob-
serves that the harm principle is “effectively collapsing under the weight of its own suc-
cess.”  Bernard E. Harcourt, The Collapse of the Harm Principle, 90 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 109, 113 (1999).  However, insofar as the substance of conservative and 
reactionary objections to prostitution continues to focus on the threat prostitution 
poses to traditional patriarchal social forms, these harm-based arguments remain ideo-
logically at odds with feminist abolitionism.  For this reason, I respectfully decline to 
follow Harcourt’s characterization of feminist arguments grounded in a concern re-
garding harm to women as part of a “proliferation of conservative harm arguments.”  
Id. at 147-54. 
47 Cf. supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
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II.  ON PROSTITUTION:  SOME ASSUMPTIONS AND CONCESSIONS 
Before presenting my arguments in favor of criminalizing the pur-
chase of sex, it is worth noting two assumptions that underpin both 
arguments:  (1) many prostituted people experience substantial harm 
in prostitution, and (2) prostitution is not valuable enough to out-
weigh those harms.  I will consider the plausibility of these assump-
tions in the final Section of this Article, but for now, note what these 
assumptions do not entail. 
First, these assumptions do not entail that every person who sells 
sex is harmed in prostitution.  Rather, for the sake of argument, it is 
possible to concede that people can genuinely consent to selling sex, 
that their consent negates any wrongful harm they might experience, 
and that in fact some people do consent.48  Note that these conces-
sions are entirely consistent with the first assumption above that many 
prostituted people do experience substantial harm in prostitution.  
Indeed, in light of these concessions, we might refine that assumption 
as follows:  many prostituted people experience substantial harm in 
prostitution, though some do not.  The fact that some people do not 
experience harm does not, of course, diminish the urgency or impor-
tance of the fact that many do.  In other words, abolitionist arguments 
need not establish that all instances of prostitution are harmful; ra-
ther, it is sufficient to motivate these arguments that often prostituted 
people are harmed in prostitution, that the harm is substantial, and 
that the value of prostitution is inadequate to justify that harm. 
Second, my assumptions do not deny that prostitution can be ge-
nuinely valuable for some people.  Rather, my second assumption is 
merely that whatever value prostitution may have, it is not valuable 
enough to outweigh the harms experienced by many prostituted 
people.  So, to be clear, I am willing to concede for the sake of argu-
ment that there are instances of prostitution that do not amount to 
sex trafficking, that some people view selling sex as a genuinely valua-
ble option, and that in viewing prostitution as a valuable option, these 
people are not necessarily mistaken, misguided, deluded, or suffering 
from some form of false consciousness.49 
48 See M. Madden Dempsey, Rethinking Wolfenden:  Prostitute-Use, Criminal Law, and 
Remote Harm, 2005 CRIM. L. REV. 444, 449-50 (making similar stipulations, but caution-
ing against mistaking a conceptual concession for a factual conclusion).  
49 These stipulations should neutralize common arguments against feminist aboli-
tionism.  For a particularly well-developed account of these arguments, see Janie 
Chuang, Student Article, Redirecting the Debate over Trafficking in Women:  Definitions, Pa-
radigms, and Contexts, 11 HARV. HUMAN RTS. J. 65, 84-96 (1998). 
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These concessions may appear to fly in the face of feminist aboli-
tionism’s understanding of prostitution, for, admittedly, feminist ab-
olitionists often characterize prostitution simply as “violence against 
women.”50  Are the stipulations offered above inconsistent with such a 
characterization?  Have I conceded so much to its critics that my ar-
gument can no longer be properly understood as feminist? 
I believe the answer is no—the feminist-abolitionist characteriza-
tion of prostitution as violence against women is not inconsistent with 
the concessions above.  Nonetheless, feminist abolitionism’s characte-
rization of prostitution is often uncharitably interpreted in a way that 
would render it inconsistent with my concessions.51  This interpreta-
tion accuses feminist abolitionism of making a sweeping conceptual 
claim about prostitution:  that the mere exchange of sex for money 
counts as violence.52 
Examples of this interpretation can be found in a recent critique 
of feminist abolitionism offered by Ronald Weitzer.  Professor Weitzer 
criticizes feminist abolitionists for claiming that prostitution is vi-
olence against women and dismisses this claim as a conceptual one—
rather than a claim about what is typically or often the case.53  His crit-
icism is particularly perplexing and unjustifiable given the weak evi-
dentiary support he offers to sustain it.  Weitzer singles out a quote 
50 See, e.g., Janice G. Raymond, Prostitution as Violence Against Women:  NGO Stonewal-
ling in Beijing and Elsewhere, 21 WOMEN’S STUD. INT’L F. 1 (1998); Finn MacKay, Prostitu-
tion Is Violence Against Women 2, http://www.ldnfeministnetwork.ik.com/attachments 
/ProstitutionIVAW.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2010); Feminist Coalition Against Prostitu-
tion (FCAP), Prostitution Is Violence Against Women, http://www.fcap.btik.com (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2010) (“We are a coalition of UK Feminist individuals and groups who 
believe that prostitution is violence against women.”). 
51 See, e.g., Ronald Weitzer, Flawed Theory and Method in Studies of Prostitution, 11 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 934, 934-35 (2005) [hereinafter Weitzer, Flawed Theory] 
(arguing that feminist theorists “view prostitution as categorically evil”); Ronald 
Weitzer, Rehashing Tired Claims About Prostitution:  A Response to Farley and Raphael and 
Shapiro, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 971, 973 (2005) (decrying “the equation of 
prostitution with violence” as “a central radical feminist tenet”). 
52 See, e.g., Weitzer, Flawed Theory, supra note 51, at 941-42 (asserting that, in femin-
ist theory, “[v]iolence is intrinsic to the very definition of prostitution, so there can be 
no prostitution without violence”).  For a similar critique, see Kamala Kempadoo’s 
complaint that “the global sex trade cannot be simply reduced to one monolithic ex-
planation of violence to women.”  Kamala Kempadoo, Women of Color and the Global Sex 
Trade:  Transnational Feminist Perspectives, 1 MERIDIANS 28, 28 (2001).  As explained 
herein, however, feminist abolitionism need not offer a “monolithic explanation” of sex 
trafficking or prostitution in order to support its response to these social phenomena. 
53 See Weitzer, Flawed Theory, supra note 51, at 936 (arguing that the feminist con-
ceptualization of prostitution as violence is a “flawed theory” because it is impossible to 
verify or disprove). 
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from Janice Raymond, a feminist abolitionist, in which she claims that 
“[t]he sexual service provided in prostitution is most often violent.”54  
Of course, the fact that a practice is most often violent is perfectly con-
sistent with a conceptual claim that the practice is not necessarily vio-
lent (i.e., that it does not, as a conceptual matter, count as violence 
itself).  So, the nonconceptual interpretation was open to Weitzer.  
Yet, instead of interpreting Professor Raymond’s words in a way that 
would have aligned her conceptual account of prostitution with one 
he finds more plausible, Weitzer opts for the uncharitable interpreta-
tion.  He does so by seizing on Raymond’s use of the word “intrinsic” 
in her claim that “violence is intrinsic to prostitution.”55  Weitzer, pre-
sumably, took Raymond to mean “intrinsic” in the sense of “by its very 
nature; . . . essential.”56  If that was her intended meaning, then her 
account of prostitution differs from both Weitzer’s and mine.  Of 
course, it is entirely possible that when Raymond claimed that “vi-
olence is intrinsic to prostitution” she meant “intrinsic” in the sense of 
“situated within” the practice of prostitution.57  Indeed, given that the 
point of Raymond’s discussion was to illustrate the violence that often 
occurs during the very performance of commercial sex acts, the latter 
definition seems more plausible. 
On this account, we can understand the feminist-abolitionist claim 
that “violence is intrinsic to prostitution” to mean that violence occurs 
within the practice of prostitution (i.e., within the very performance of 
the commercial sex act).  And of course it does.  Even Weitzer does 
not deny that.58  Now, whether this intrinsic violence occurs often 
might remain an issue that Weitzer and Raymond still have to de-
bate—but Weitzer avoids this substantive debate by mischaracterizing 
the feminist-abolitionist claim about prostitution as one that alleges all 
acts of prostitution are, as a matter of conceptual necessity, violent. 
In sum, Weitzer’s interpretation of feminist abolitionists’ claims 
about prostitution should be rejected because it ignores the target of 
the feminist critique:  the social practice of prostitution in the real 
54 Id. at 942 (quoting Janice G. Raymond, Prostitution on Demand:  Legalizing the 
Buyers as Sexual Consumers, 10 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1156, 1175 (2004)). 
55 See id. at 941-42 (quoting Raymond, supra note 54, at 1175) (claiming that radi-
cal feminists’ argument that “violence is intrinsic to prostitution” obviates the need to 
determine how much violence actually occurs). 
56 8 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 22 (R.W. Burchfield ed., 2d ed. 1989).   
57 Id. 
58 See Weitzer, Flawed Theory, supra note 51, at 945-46 (“Violence in prostitution is a 
serious problem.”). 
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world.59  As a social practice, rather than an abstract concept, prostitu-
tion is subject to the feminist critique because violence is typical of its 
practice.  The feminist claim that “prostitution is violence against 
women” can therefore be more charitably understood as a claim that 
treats violence against women as an umbrella concept, extending over a 
number of related social phenomena, such as domestic violence, rape, 
sexual harassment, and stalking.  Each phenomenon bears salient re-
semblances to the others, in virtue of the tendency each has to sustain 
and perpetuate patriarchal structural inequalities.60  In this sense, each 
phenomenon is properly categorized as violence against women. 
III.  CRIMINALIZING THE PURCHASE OF SEX 
Now that we have a better sense of what feminist abolitionism is, 
we can ask what does it want?  As noted in Part I, feminist abolitionism 
advocates the abolition of sex trafficking and prostitution.  These 
goals, of course, are not unconnected.  Moreover, they are not iso-
lated from the feminist project of dismantling patriarchal structural 
inequality and all wrongful structural inequalities in general.  From a 
feminist-abolitionist view, therefore, abolition of prostitution is in-
strumentally valuable to the abolishment of sex trafficking, and the 
abolishment of sex trafficking is both intrinsically valuable and in-
strumentally valuable in creating a post-patriarchal society. 
As noted in the Introduction, feminist abolitionism advocates a 
multifaceted approach to abolishing sex trafficking.  The touchstone 
of this approach is providing realistic and valuable alternatives for 
prostituted people or those who are at risk of being prostituted.  In 
practice, this involves decriminalizing the sale of sex and providing 
social welfare such as adequate shelter, nutrition, healthcare, drug re-
habilitation, education, childcare support, employment opportunities, 
and other resources and support depending on circumstances.  
Alongside these reforms, feminist abolitionists seek to hold traffickers, 
pimps, and abusive customers accountable for causing direct harm to 
59 Of course, criticism of prostitution can focus solely on the commodification of 
sex, without attending to the harms prostitution causes in the real world, but such an 
abstraction—which obscures the relationship between commodification and subordi-
nation—would provide little basis for objecting to commodification in the first place.  
See RADIN, supra note 13, at 160-63 (“Commodification of significant attributes of per-
sonhood cannot be easily uncoupled from wrongful subordination.”). 
60 For a similar account of the relationship between rape and domestic violence, 
see Michelle Madden Dempsey, What Counts as Domestic Violence?  A Conceptual Analysis, 
12 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 301, 328-29 (2006). 
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prostituted people.  The third aspect of the feminist-abolitionist ap-
proach to sex trafficking focuses on public-education campaigns.  
Through the use of popular media, abolitionists seek to change the 
social norms that support sex trafficking, by encouraging communities 
to recognize its existence and its harmfulness, and ultimately to repu-
diate the norms that sustain it.61 
One controversial way in which feminist abolitionists have sought 
to achieve their goals is through the criminalization of the purchase of 
sex.  At first glance, this approach may seem overly broad:  Why cri-
minalize the purchase of sex when the problem is the trafficking of sex?  
Why not simply focus on the traffickers and leave the buyers alone?  
Surely, if we could stop the traffickers, then sex trafficking would be 
abolished—goal accomplished, case closed.  Once we abolish sex traf-
ficking, we might very well be left with innocuous or even valuable 
forms of prostitution—but given the concessions above, that result 
should not be a matter of regret, right?  For I just admitted, did I not, 
that prostitution can be genuinely valuable?  If so, then why target the 
purchase of sex generally?  Is the feminist-abolitionist call to criminal-
ize the purchase of sex actually inconsistent with the supposed conces-
sions offered above?  In other words, once we seek to criminalize the 
purchase of sex, are we showing our hand—revealing our true, yet 
undisclosed, belief that prostitution itself is the problem? 
Well, no . . . but we are revealing something about what we take to 
be the relationship between both (1) sex trafficking and the purchase 
of sex generally and (2) sex trafficking and prostitute-use.  In order to 
illustrate these relationships and frame the arguments below, it will be 
helpful to set out a simplified timeframe that identifies key events oc-
curring in the typical practice of sex trafficking and the purchase of 
sex more generally.  I will use the labels T1, T2, and so on, to indicate 
sequential points, although it is not necessary that each of these events 
takes place in the chronology set forth below.  Specifically, the events 
occurring at T2, T3, and T4 need not occur sequentially. 
T1:  Trafficker traffics Victim;62 
61 For a discussion of the range of methods advocated under the Swedish model, 
see Ekberg, supra note 2, at 1188-91.   
62 I will adopt the definition of trafficking set out in Article 3 of the U.N. Protocol 
to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Child-
ren, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized 
Crime, which states in relevant part that 
(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment, transportation, trans-
fer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or 
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T2:  Purchaser pays for sex with Victim; 
T3:  Purchaser has sex with Victim; 
T4:  Trafficker receives some or all of the payment made by Pur-
chaser at T2; 
T5:  Trafficker continues to traffic Victim (and possibly traffics ad-
ditional victims). 
It is not strictly relevant to the analysis that follows whether the 
Purchaser has sex with the Victim before or after paying, or whether 
the Trafficker profits before or after the Purchaser has sex with the 
Victim.  Rather, my reason for delineating discrete timeframes is to 
isolate the relevance of each event in context, so as to appreciate the 
relationship between sex trafficking and the purchase of sex more 
generally.  The ordinal relationship among these instances is largely 
irrelevant; instead, the most salient features are the motivational and 
contextual relationships between these events.  Specifically, the moti-
vational relationship between the events at T4 and T5 is key to the ar-
gument from complicity set out below; while the contextual relation-
ship between T1 and T3 is key to the argument from endangerment 
set out below.  These arguments are explained in the following two 
Sections. 
other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of pay-
ments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over 
another person, for the purpose of exploitation.  Exploitation shall include, at 
a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of 
sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to 
slavery, servitude or the removal of organs; 
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploita-
tion set forth in subparagraph (a) of this article shall be irrelevant where any 
of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used. 
G.A. Res. 55/25, Annex II, art. 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 ( Jan. 8, 2001) [hereinafter 
Palermo Protocol]. 
 Given that this definition is a mouthful, recounting it each time I refer to traffick-
ing below will prove awkward.  I will therefore use the phrase “force, threats, coercion, 
etc.” to capture the sort of events that occur at T1.  I do not, however, mean to imply 
that the definition of trafficking in the Palermo Protocol is limited to cases involving 
force, threats, or coercion.  For a critique of misrepresentations of the terms of the Pa-
lermo Protocol definition, which unduly limit the scope of what counts as trafficking, 
see Kaethe Morris Hoffer, A Response to Sex Trafficking Chicago Style:  Follow the Sisters,  
Speak Out, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1831 (2010). 
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A.  The Argument from Complicity 
One argument supporting the feminist-abolitionist call to crimi-
nalize the purchase of sex is grounded in a theory of complicity re-
sponsibility.  Complicity is a form of responsibility that focuses on the 
contribution one person makes to another person’s wrongdoing.63  
With respect to any given wrong, the person who commits the wrong 
directly is referred to as the principal, while the person who “acts with 
the consequence or result that the principal commits the wrong” is 
called the accomplice.64  For example, if A encourages P to murder V, 
and P murders V, then both P and A are responsible for the death of V 
in virtue of the contribution each made to that harm:  P contributed 
to the death of V by murdering him, whereas A’s contribution to V ’s 
death was her encouragement of P.  The key to understanding ac-
complice responsibility, therefore, is the notion that the accomplice’s 
conduct makes a difference to the principal’s wrongdoing.65 
With regard to criminalizing the purchase of sex, the argument 
from complicity focuses on the buyer’s complicity in the harms com-
mitted by traffickers and violent pimps against prostituted people.  
Stated in terms of its key premises, the argument is that 
(1) purchasing sex creates market demand for prostitution; 
63 My argument is not that people who buy sex are already liable under the crimi-
nal law doctrines of complicity.  Rather it is that these people are responsible for 
wrongdoing by virtue of the complicitous relationship that their conduct bears to the 
harms inflicted on prostituted people.  For two particularly helpful accounts of this 
sense of complicity responsibility, see CHRISTOPHER KUTZ, COMPLICITY 209-18 (2000), 
and John Gardner, Complicity and Causality, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 127, 128 (2007). 
64 Gardner, supra note 63, at 141.  In criminal law, complicity liability or accom-
plice liability involves holding the accomplice liable for the principal’s crime.  See, e.g., 
18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2006) (providing for the punishment of accomplices as principals); 
Accessories and Abettors Act, 1861, 24 & 25 Vict., c. 94, § 8 (Eng.) (same).  The com-
mon law distinctions between different forms of accessory participation—for example, 
aiding, abetting, counseling, procuring, inducing, and encouraging—and categoriza-
tions such as “accessory before the fact” versus “accessory after the fact” are not rele-
vant to our discussion.  
65 The particular kind of difference that must be made is a matter of some debate, 
but all sides agree that the test for complicity is met in cases where the accomplice’s 
conduct makes a but-for causal contribution to the principal’s wrongdoing.  For the 
sake of simplicity in outlining the argument here, I will focus on this sort of contribu-
tion.  For arguments on both sides of the causal-contribution debate in complicity re-
sponsibility, compare the view expressed in Gardner, supra note 63, which argues that 
there is no way to participate in the wrongs of another without causally contributing to 
them, with that expressed in Christopher Kutz, Causeless Complicity, 1 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 
289 (2007), which argues that “we can be complicit in others’ wrongs without making a 
[causal] difference to the occurrence of these wrongs.”  Id. at 290. 
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(2) the market demand for prostitution creates a profit motive 
for traffickers and pimps to satisfy that demand (i.e., to pro-
cure and maintain a supply of people who will sell sex or be 
sold for sex); 
(3) the profit motive generated by market demand encourages 
traffickers and pimps to procure and maintain a supply of 
people who will sell sex or be sold for sex; 
(4) in procuring and maintaining a supply of people who will sell 
sex or be sold for sex, traffickers and pimps often engage in 
harmful conduct against these prostituted people (using, for 
example, force, threats, coercion, etc. against them); 
(5) thus, by purchasing sex, one encourages conduct by traffick-
ers and pimps that is often harmful to prostituted people. 
According to the argument from complicity, the direct harm at is-
sue is the use of threats, force, coercion, or other harmful measures by 
traffickers and pimps against prostituted people.  It is therefore the 
traffickers and pimps who are responsible as principals, while those 
who purchase sex are indirectly responsible as accessories.  People 
who buy sex, in other words, are complicit in the harms directly in-
flicted by traffickers and abusive pimps, in virtue of the market de-
mand generated by the buyers’ purchase of sex and the influence this 
demand has on the conduct of traffickers and abusive pimps. 
One objection to the argument from complicity is grounded in 
the claim that people who purchase sex are not proper targets for 
criminalization because their conduct is not culpable.  I will refer to 
this objection as the “objection-from-culpability.”  According to this 
objection, people who purchase sex may in fact encourage traffickers 
and abusive pimping but this mere fact does not constitute a culpable 
contribution to these harms. 
The grain of truth in this objection is that, typically, legislatures 
are not justified in using the criminal law to prohibit nonculpable 
conduct.66  The objection fails, however, because people who purchase 
sex typically are culpable with regard to the risk of contributing to 
trafficking and abusive pimping.  Moreover, in the rare instances in 
which culpability is lacking, there remains adequate justification for 
imposing liability on prophylactic grounds. 
66 See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION 66 (2008). 
1754 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 158: 1729 
At the risk of oversimplification, it can be said that culpability is a 
matter of one’s state of mind as it relates to the harms to which one 
causally contributes.67  States of mind such as intention and purpose 
are paradigmatic mental states for grounding culpability.68  For exam-
ple, in the complicity-responsibility case outlined above, in which A 
encourages P to murder V, A would be culpable for encouraging P if 
her purpose in so doing or the intention with which she acted was to 
bring about the death of C. 
It is possible, however, to be complicit in another’s harmful con-
duct without having a culpable purpose or intention.  A might have 
simply complained about V to P, never intending to encourage P to 
harm V.  If P nonetheless took A’s complaints as encouragement to 
kill V, then A would in fact be complicit in the death of V.  However, if 
we assume that A had no idea that her complaints might encourage P 
to harm V, then A would not be culpable for her complicity. 
Neither extreme seems to capture the typical case of buying sex.  
While some particularly bad actors may purchase sex with the purpose 
or intention to encourage traffickers and pimps to harm prostituted 
people, it seems fair to assume that this is probably not typically the 
case.69  On the other hand, most people who purchase sex surely are 
not so naïve as to fail to realize that their conduct generates a market 
demand that is quite often satisfied through trafficking and abusive 
pimping.  Indeed, it seems fair to assume that people who purchase 
sex typically do realize that their conduct generates a market demand 
for prostitution and that the demand for prostitution is often satisfied 
through trafficking and abusive pimping.70 
67 See generally Rollin M. Perkins, A Rationale of Mens Rea, 52 HARV. L. REV. 905 
(1939) (exploring the concept of mens rea in the criminal law context). 
68 Id. at 908-11. 
69 It may, however, be more typical than commonly understood. See, e.g., infra 
notes 70-71. 
70 A recent survey of prostitute-users included statements like these: 
I don’t get pleasure from other people’s suffering.  I struggle with it but I can’t 
deny my own pleasures.  In Cambodia I knocked back a lot of children; it makes 
it hard to sleep at night.  But I don’t see the point in making a moral stance. 
[By paying for sex] [y]ou are the boss and get what you want. 
Everyone recognises the objectification as part of the business exchange of 
prostitution. 
JAN MACLEOD ET AL., CHALLENGING MEN’S DEMAND FOR PROSTITUTION IN SCOTLAND:  
A RESEARCH REPORT BASED ON INTERVIEWS WITH 110 MEN WHO BOUGHT WOMEN IN 
PROSTITUTION 14-20 (2008), available at http://www.prostitutionresearch.com/ 
ChallengingDemandScotland.pdf.   
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Of course, even if the typical buyer recognizes the risk that his 
conduct contributes to trafficking and abusive pimping, he may wish 
that this were not so.  Other things being equal, he may prefer a world 
in which he can purchase sex without contributing to these harms.  
But, given the realities of the world as it is, he nonetheless purchases 
sex, aware of the risk that he may indeed be contributing.71  Where 
buyers realize that their market conduct creates the risk of trafficking 
and abusive pimping, they possess the mens rea of recklessness and 
are thus culpable in their complicity.72 
In cases where people purchase sex while aware of their contribu-
tion to trafficking and abusive pimping (or at least aware of the risk of 
their contribution) the objection from culpability fails.  But are all 
people who purchase sex aware of the risk that they could be contri-
buting to trafficking and abusive pimping?  Those with adequate fi-
nancial resources, for example, may convince themselves of their abil-
ity to buy their way out of such complicity by restricting themselves to 
high-priced “call girls” or women who do not have pimps.73  They may 
indeed convince themselves that segments of the prostitution market 
can be isolated, such that market demand in so-called “elite” prostitu-
tion does not contribute to trafficking and abusive pimping.  The real-
ities of “elite” prostitution, however, suggest otherwise:  paying more 
71 For a study of men who buy sex, see TEELA SANDERS, PAYING FOR PLEASURE:  
MEN WHO BUY SEX (2008).  One man, a thirty-six-year-old charity worker, stated of hav-
ing sexual encounters with prostitutes working on the streets, 
[T]o be honest I feel it’s exploitation. . . . [Prostituted people] are there be-
cause they’re desperate and they’ve nothing else to do and there’s no other 
choice for them.  I mean . . . I don’t feel happy about doing that because I’m 
aware that some of the people I saw . . . were fairly obviously drug addicts.  
Quite a lot of them I suspect may have been quite young; sort of sixteen, se-
venteen. . . . I mean I wasn’t proud about [it] . . . . It was interesting and it was 
fascinating but wrong.  
Id. at 52. 
72 See Sanford H. Kadish, Reckless Complicity, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 369, 378-
82 (1997) (discussing recklessness as adequate to ground culpability for complicity). 
73 Sanders concludes that these men demonstrated “concern with the exploita-
tion” in prostitution and viewed the purchase of sex in some market segments as unac-
ceptable.  SANDERS, supra note 71, at 53.  There are two interesting points to note re-
garding Sanders’s study.  First, the evidence does indeed support the conclusion that 
the men recognized that many prostituted people in these market segments were be-
ing harmed and that purchasing sex in these markets would contribute to the continu-
ation of these harms.  See id. (“Most men demonstrated an awareness of the types of 
exploitation that are associated with the sex industry . . . .”).  Second, the men’s recog-
nition of this fact did not, by and large, deter them from purchasing sex.  See id. at 49-56 
(describing how the men’s recognition of exploitative behavior “informed which markets 
they approached” but did not necessarily deter them from purchasing sex altogether). 
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for sex does not guarantee that the sex is not procured through harm-
ful means.74  Moreover, as with many markets, demand for high-priced 
goods impacts the market as a whole—the purchase of sex in the 
“elite” segment of the prostitution market may have a tendency to en-
courage demand and supply throughout.75 
Even if some people who purchase sex sincerely believe that their 
conduct does not encourage trafficking or abusive pimping—in other 
words, they lack the mens rea of recklessness—it may nonetheless be 
justifiable to prohibit buying sex without regard to proof of mens rea.  
Such criminal offenses—referred to as strict liability offenses76—are 
notably distinct from culpability-based offenses, insofar as they cannot 
be justified on retributive grounds.  A legislature may, however, draw 
upon harm prevention as justification for enacting such offenses, pro-
vided that the penalty for violating the prohibition is at a fairly low 
level.77  The ability of a strict liability prohibition against purchasing 
sex to provide epistemic guidance to buyers would also arguably con-
tribute to its justification, particularly given the extent to which buyers 
74 See, e.g., Man Gets 8 Years for Turning Teen into Prostitute:  Another Name Put on Sex 
Offender Registry, TORONTO STAR, June 18, 2008, at A14, available at 2008 WLNR 
11461066 (reporting the case of Josh Mfizi, who abusively pimped a teenage girl and 
charged buyers three hundred dollars per hour). 
75 An example of this phenomenon can be found in the relationship between 
market demand for genuine designer handbags and knock-off replicas, in which elite-
segment market demand (i.e., demand for the expensive, genuine bags) creates an 
“aspirational effect” that in turn generates market demand in non-elite segments (i.e., 
demand for knock-offs).  See Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal Street: Ref-
lections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1381, 1408-11 (2005) (noting that “non-elite consumers” are likely to “value more 
highly the relevant good . . . given a perceived increase in the frequency of usage 
among elite consumers”). 
 The more attenuated the market dynamics, the less risk any prostitute-user has of 
contributing to the ultimate harm, but this “argument from reduced probabilities does 
not in principle defeat the case for reckless complicity.”  Kadish, supra note 72, at 381. 
76 Of course, the sort of offense I have in mind would not be entirely strict as to 
each element of the actus reus.  Rather, it would be strict only as to the risk that the 
buyer’s conduct contributes to trafficking and abusive pimping.  With respect to the 
actus reus element of purchasing sex, however, the normal mens rea requirements 
would apply. 
77 See, e.g., Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 53A (Eng.) (as amended by Policing 
and Crime Act, 2009, c. 26, § 14 (Eng.)) (criminalizing the act of “paying for sexual 
services of a prostitute subjected to force, threats, . . . or any other form of coercion, 
or . . . deception” in England and Wales).  It is irrelevant under the statute whether the 
buyer is, or ought to be, aware that the trafficker or pimp has engaged in such harmful 
conduct.  Id.     
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are motivated to err in estimating the contribution their conduct 
makes to trafficking and abusive pimping.78 
Framed in these terms, does the argument from complicity prove 
too much?  If people who buy sex can be criminalized in virtue of 
their conduct’s contribution to trafficking and abusive pimping, what 
principled objection can there be to criminalizing people who buy any 
goods or services in markets where supply chains are procured and 
maintained through harmful means?  For example, if the market de-
mand I generate through my purchase of Nike running shoes encou-
rages actors in the supply chain to use child labor to supply the 
shoes,79 can I properly be criminalized according to the argument 
from complicity? 
Julia O’Connell Davidson and Bridget Anderson gesture toward 
this reductio ad absurdum objection to the argument from complicity 
in their report on market demand in trafficking: 
[T]he idea that the entire commercial sex market should be eradicated 
in order to tackle the problem of trafficking for prostitution[] is as dra-
conian and wrong-headed as the idea that it is necessary to eliminate 
demand for carpets in order to address the problem of forced and child 
labour in the carpet industry.
80
 
There are, of course, significant differences between the purchase 
of shoes or carpets and the purchase of sex that may limit the force of 
the reductio objection.  Two key differences may justify extending the 
argument from complicity to the purchase of sex, even if other forms 
of market demand might not be appropriately targeted.  First, markets 
for goods such as shoes and carpets introduce multiple actors into the 
supply chain, attenuating the relationship between the purchaser and 
the directly harmful conduct perpetrated against the forced or child 
laborers.  While this consideration is not a principled objection to the 
78 SANDERS, supra note 71, at 55-56; see also Julia O’Connell Davidson, Eroticizing 
Prostitute Use (discussing rationality errors by people who purchase sex, for example, 
the “fiction of mutuality”), in PROSTITUTION 189, 209-11 (Roger Matthews & Maggie 
O’Neill eds., 2003). 
79 See Steve Boggan, Nike Admits to Mistakes over Child Labour, INDEPENDENT (Lon-
don), Oct. 20, 2001, at 15 (reporting Nike corporation’s admission that it “blew it” by 
employing child labor in developing countries). 
80 BRIDGET ANDERSON & JULIA O’CONNELL DAVIDSON, INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION, 
IS TRAFFICKING IN HUMAN BEINGS DEMAND DRIVEN?  A MULTI-COUNTRY PILOT STUDY 
10-11 (2003), available at http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/pdfs/Bridget_ 
Anderson/BA1_Anderson%20IOM%20report.pdf.  Neither Anderson nor O’Connell 
Davidson endorses this argument, which they characterize as equally problematic as 
those calling for the abolition of prostitution.  Id. at 11.  
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argument from complicity, it does caution against extending its scope 
into complex multistep manufacturing markets.81 
A second distinction of note between buying sex and buying shoes 
or carpets lies in the relationship between the person who does the 
buying and the sorts of harms inflicted on the person who is subjected 
to force, threats, coercion, etc.  In buying shoes or carpets, one does 
not inflict any additional, direct harm on the person who was forced 
to manufacture the goods.  In buying sex, however, this additional 
harm—or at least the risk of it—is directly inflicted by the purchaser 
in the sexual act of prostitute-use.  The infliction of this additional 
harm (or risk thereof) establishes another key normative link between 
the purchaser of commercial sex and the harms of trafficking and ab-
usive pimping. 
Dennis Baker emphasizes the importance of establishing this 
normative link when he observes that a person can be responsible for 
causing harm by “creat[ing] ‘the demand’ for the conduct that causes 
the primary harm.”82  But this fact, standing alone, is not sufficient to 
establish the normative link required in order to justify criminalizing 
the demand-creator’s conduct.  For, as Baker observes, “merely in-
fluencing another’s criminal choice is not sufficient for establishing a 
normative link.”83  He illustrates this point by asking whether a televi-
sion crew should be held criminally liable for “creating the demand 
for nude and violent street protests” that it happens to record for the 
news program.84  “Would it not be an intolerable extension of criminal 
responsibility,” Baker asks, “if television crews were held criminally li-
able for exercising their lawful rights and liberties, simply because it 
might encourage others to engage in criminality?”85 
Baker is clearly correct that merely influencing another’s criminal 
choice is not sufficient to establish a normative link between that per-
son’s conduct and the relevant harm.  As Baker’s hypothetical aptly 
illustrates, people influence one another’s criminal choices in all sorts 
of ways that would not make them complicit in causing the resulting 
harms.  The street protesters’ violence may well have been heightened 
81 See Kadish, supra note 72, at 381 (acknowledging that as intervening actors in-
crease in number, the probability of harm decreases and approaches a point where 
risks created are too tenuous to constitute recklessness).   
82 Dennis J. Baker, The Moral Limits of Criminalizing Remote Harms, 10 NEW CRIM. L. 
REV. 370, 386-87 (2007). 
83 Id. 
84 Id. at 387. 
85 Id. 
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by the presence of the television crew—but we should not, on those 
grounds alone, conclude that the harm caused by the protest is fairly 
imputed to the crew. 
There are, however, a number of reasons why the television-crew 
hypothetical is inapposite to the concerns raised by my argument.  
First, the potential defendants isolated in Baker’s hypothetical (the 
television crew) do not occupy a relevantly similar position to people 
who purchase sex, since the crew does not create market demand for 
the violent activity.  Rather, in some sense at least, it is the television 
audience that creates the market demand.  So, in order to isolate the 
relevant potential defendants (those who create market demand), we 
have to ask about the responsibilities of viewers who constitute the tel-
evision audience of the news footage (or, even more on point, we 
should ask about the responsibility of the “pay-per-viewers,” who pay 
to observe the particular footage at issue). 
Second, the hypothetical fails to identify any relevant harm in the 
sense that concerns my argument from complicity.  If my argument 
focused on the exploitation of prostituted people (rather than on the 
harms they suffer), then Baker’s hypothetical might suggest an inter-
esting comparison to reality TV shows or videos that arguably exploit 
their participants.86  Assuming participants in these shows are ex-
ploited, we can ask whether pay-per-viewers are normatively linked to 
that exploitation by virtue of the fact that they generate its market 
demand.  I think the answer is clearly yes—there is a normative link.  
As such, pay-per-viewers of exploitative footage are typically complicit 
in the exploitation they pay to watch, by virtue of their creation of 
market demand.  Importantly, however, this conclusion does not tell 
us anything interesting about whether such pay-per-viewers can prop-
erly be criminalized.  It simply suggests that (1) exploitation should 
not count as harm for the purpose of applying the harm principle in 
the context of criminalization (which is why I do not rely on it for the 
prostitute-use argument); and (2) the normative link Baker seeks is 
quite easily satisfied in the typical case. 
In responding to Baker’s hypothetical above, I limited my conclu-
sion to the claim that pay-per-viewers of exploitative footage are typi-
cally complicit in the exploitation they pay to watch.  This limitation 
86 For contenders on a list of exploitative reality television shows and videos, con-
sider the 2009 season of Britain’s Got Talent, which ended with the mental breakdown 
and hospitalization of Susan Boyle, and videos such as the Girls Gone Wild series.  See 
Susan Boyle Suffers Emotional Breakdown, PEOPLE.COM, May 31, 2009, http:// 
www.people.com/people/article/0,,20282349,00.html. 
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allows for the possibility that a person may be justified in contributing 
to wrongdoing by generating market demand and, if justified, would 
not be properly deemed complicit, all things considered.87  For exam-
ple, in purchasing the exploitative footage in order to study—and ul-
timately remedy or limit—its negative effects, a purchaser makes a 
causal contribution that would render her prima facie complicit in the 
exploitation.  Yet, by virtue of the justification she has for making the 
purchase, she would not properly be considered complicit, all things 
considered.88 
A similar argument regarding complicity and justification operates 
in the context of paying for sex and exonerates the conduct of people 
like Nicholas Kristof, a Pulitzer Prize–winning journalist for the New 
York Times.  Kristof has spent the better part of fifteen years studying 
prostitution in locations such as Cambodia and India.89  His metho-
dology for gaining access to interview subjects is to pose as a prosti-
tute-user and pay brothel keepers for the “services” of prostituted 
women and girls.90  Once Kristof is alone with the prostituted women 
and girls, he attempts to gather information regarding, inter alia, the 
trafficking and the abusive pimping to which they are subjected.91  He 
then uses that information to publicize the plight of women and girls 
prostituted throughout the world and encourage action to end these 
abuses.92  By paying money to the brothel keepers—a payment that 
brothel keepers believe is made in exchange for sex with the prosti-
tuted women and girls they control—Kristof contributes to the harms 
of trafficking and pimping in the same way that any other purchaser 
does:  he generates market demand.  According to the argument from 
87 For a discussion of complicity and justification, see generally Gardner, supra 
note 63, at 138-40.  See also John Gardner, Justification and Reasons, in HARM AND CUL-
PABILITY 103 (A.P. Simester & A.T.H. Smith eds., 1996).  
88 See Gardner, supra note 63, at 140 (arguing that some questions of justification 
need to be addressed before classifying an agent as complicit, including whether alter-
native wrongs were avoided). 
89 These experiences are recounted in KRISTOF & WUDUNN, supra note 22, at 29, 
35, 37-38; Nicholas D. Kristof, Asian Childhoods Sacrificed to Prosperity’s Lust, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 14, 1996, at A1 [hereinafter Kristof, Asian Childhoods]; Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., 
Girls for Sale, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2004, at A15 [hereinafter Kristof, Girls for Sale]; Nicho-
las D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Leaving the Brothel Behind, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005, at A19 [he-
reinafter Kristof, Leaving the Brothel Behind]; Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., Stopping the 
Traffickers, N.Y. Times, Jan. 31, 2004 at A17 [hereinafter Kristof, Stopping the Traffickers].  
90 See Kristof, Girls for Sale, supra note 89 (“The only way to have access to the girls 
is to appear to be a customer.”). 
91 See id. (documenting a discussion with a prostituted teenage girl in Cambodia 
about her experiences and desire to free herself). 
92 Id. 
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complicity, Kristof is therefore prima facie complicit for those harms.  
However, if Kristof’s payments to the brothel keepers allow him to ob-
tain information that he then uses in order to reduce the total inci-
dence of trafficking and prostitution (or other wrongs), and if that 
reduction is the reason why Kristof made the payments, then he cann-
not properly be deemed complicit all things considered.  In other 
words, insofar as Kristof is justified in paying the brothel keepers, his 
contribution to the harms of trafficking and abusive pimping amounts 
merely to prima facie complicity and not complicity all things consi-
dered.93 
A final, related objection to the argument from complicity con-
cerns the question of criminalizing people who choose to sell sex:  if 
people who choose to buy sex are complicit in driving the prostitution 
market, are the people who choose to sell sex not complicit as well?  
Or, to state the question differently, if anyone actually does freely 
choose to sell sex, is she not complicit as well?  As Julia O’Connell Da-
vidson and Bridget Anderson put the point, “[W]e could almost say 
that supply generates demand rather than the other way round.”94  If 
the argument from complicity extends to criminalizing those who 
choose to sell sex, it would pose a serious objection to the feminist-
abolitionist project, since feminist abolitionism has, almost uniformly, 
rejected criminalizing the sale of sex. 
The resolution to this apparent dilemma for feminist abolitionism 
lies in recognizing the complexity of the notion that someone has 
freely chosen to sell sex.  No choice is free in the sense of being wholly 
without constraint, and of those who might be said to have made a 
choice to sell sex, most do so because of economic need or other pres-
sures—which is simply to say that prostitution “is not an option many 
women choose with alacrity, when many other options are on their 
plate.”95  This fact suggests that most people who sell sex are in a simi-
lar normative position to that examined above in the case of Kristof’s 
purchase of sex.  Insofar as people choose to sell sex, they are prima 
facie complicit for driving demand—but insofar as they do so for good 
reasons—for example, to pay for living expenses, provide for children, 
93 See Gardner, supra note 63, at 139-40 (discussing the propensity of potential ac-
complices to a crime to justify their conduct “by reference to the difference that [they] 
made to the overall incidence of wrongdoing”). 
94 ANDERSON & O’CONNELL DAVIDSON, supra note 80, at 41. 
95 NUSSBAUM, supra note 13, at 296. 
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or fund their education—their conduct is justified, and thus they are 
not properly deemed complicit all things considered.96 
B.  The Argument from Endangerment 
Another argument supporting the feminist-abolitionist call to cri-
minalize the purchase of sex is grounded in a theory of responsibility 
for endangerment.  One is responsible for endangering another if 
one’s conduct creates a significant risk of harming that person.  Note 
that one can still be responsible for endangering another person even 
if no harm actually results.  The key to endangerment, rather, is simp-
ly posing the risk of harm.  As Antony Duff puts it, “[i]f the risk is not 
actualised, I merely endanger him; if it is actualised, I endanger him 
and harm him.”97 
Unlike the argument from complicity, which focuses on the buy-
er’s conduct at the time of paying for sex, the argument from endan-
germent focuses on the buyer’s conduct at the time he is actually hav-
ing sex with a prostituted person.  Stated in terms of its key premises, 
the argument from endangerment picks up where the argument from 
complicity left off: 
(1) In procuring and maintaining a supply of people who will sell 
sex or be sold for sex, traffickers and pimps often engage in 
harmful conduct (e.g., force, threats, coercion, etc.) against 
these prostituted people; 
(2) but for the threats, force, coercion, etc., these prostituted 
people would not submit to commercial sex; 
(3) having sex with someone who would not submit but for force, 
threats, coercion, etc., harms that person; 
(4) in having sex with a prostituted person, one risks having sex 
with someone who would not submit but for force, threats, 
coercion, etc.; 
96 See supra text accompanying notes 87-93.  If there are any people who sell sex 
without good reason—in other words, people who have no economic need or any oth-
er justifiable reason for participating in the market for sex—then the argument from 
complicity would extend to condemning their conduct.  However, given the extreme 
unlikelihood that any significant number of people fall into this category, and given 
the likelihood that their conduct may otherwise be excused, there are strong reasons to 
stand by feminist abolitionism’s blanket refusal to endorse criminalizing the sale of sex. 
97 R.A. DUFF, ANSWERING FOR CRIME 151 (2007). 
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(5) thus, in having sex with a prostituted person, one risks harm-
ing that person. 
According to the argument from endangerment, the direct harm 
at issue is the sexual conduct with a person who has been forced, 
threatened, coerced, etc., into submitting to the commercial sex act.  
The purchaser is no longer merely an accomplice to the traffickers’ or 
pimps’ directly harmful conduct (as is the case in the argument from 
complicity); rather, according to the argument from endangerment, it 
is the purchaser himself who is the principal.  He directly inflicts the 
harm—or at least takes the risk that he may be directly inflicting this 
harm. 
In cases where force, threats, coercion, or deception used by the 
trafficker are sufficient to vitiate the prostituted person’s consent to 
engage in commercial sex, the harm inflicted by the purchaser in the 
act of prostitute-use is not simply risked, it is actually inflicted.  This 
harm, inflicted directly on the prostituted person, is tantamount to 
the harm experienced in the paradigmatic sexual offenses of rape and 
sexual assault.98  Being subjected to rape or sexual assault is, of course, 
typically extremely harmful to the victim99—this is the harm to which 
Evelina Giobbe referred when she famously characterized the pur-
chase of commercial sex in prostitution as “buying the right to 
98 See Victor Tadros, No Consent:  A Historical Critique of the Actus Reus of Rape, 3 
EDINBURGH L. REV. 317, 335 (1999) (“It would seem unobjectionable to convict [a] 
client of rape if he was aware that [a prostituted person] was being threatened with 
force.”).  I characterize these harms as “tantamount” to rape and sexual assault to allow 
for distinction between these harms, which are serious and considerable in their own 
right, and the harms experienced by prostituted people when they experience sexual 
violations in prostitution that are more commonly identified as rape or sexual assault.  
99 For a classic study of the harms of sexual violence, see LIZ KELLY, SURVIVING 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 186-216 (1988).  The harmfulness of sexual violation in prostitu-
tion, of course, is typically not a one-time event but is instead part of a continuing pat-
tern, with each incident of prostitute-use contributing to the harm.  For a detailed 
analysis of the harms suffered by chronically traumatized people, including prostituted 
people, see generally JUDITH LEWIS HERMAN, TRAUMA AND RECOVERY 7-74 (1992).  Me-
lissa Farley has documented the harmfulness of sexual violation in prostitution in a 
series of works.  See PROSTITUTION, TRAFFICKING, AND TRAUMATIC STRESS (Melissa 
Farley ed., 2003) (providing a collection of essays about prostitution and traumatic 
stress); Melissa Farley, Prostitution and the Invisibility of Harm, 26 WOMEN & THERAPY 
247, 248 (2003) (criticizing the “social and legal refusal to acknowledge the harm of 
prostitution”); Melissa Farley et al., Prostitution in Five Countries:  Violence and Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, 8 FEMINISM & PSYCHOL. 405 (1998) (documenting the 
violence and traumatic stress inflicted on women who are prostituted).  For a discus-
sion of the limitations of the trauma model to understanding sexual violence, see 
Sharon M. Wasco, Conceptualizing the Harm Done by Rape:  Applications of Trauma Theory 
to Experiences of Sexual Assault, 4 TRAUMA, VIOLENCE & ABUSE 309, 309-22 (2003).   
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rape.”100  As Giobbe correctly observes, “[i]n order for a choice to be 
made freely there must be an absence of coercion or violence.”101  
Where coercion and violence are present, the act of prostitute-use is 
tantamount to rape.102 
As I conceded above, it is possible that some people who sell sex 
genuinely consent to do so.  In those instances of prostitute-use, the 
purchaser does not inflict the sort of harm identified here.  Rather, 
the person who purchases sex merely risks imposing this harm.  To 
risk the infliction of harm on another person is to endanger that per-
son.  Endangerment—which can be distinguished from an attack103—
is best understood as “the creation of risk without any intention to 
cause either the relevant substantive harm or the risk of it.”104  In the 
criminal law, endangerment is paradigmatically criminalized as an of-
fense that requires a mens rea of recklessness (i.e., an awareness of 
taking an unjustified risk).  Indeed, many jurisdictions have a blanket 
offense covering all forms of reckless endangerment.105  Such offenses 
are grounded on the belief that “[i]f we act, without justification, in a 
way that we realise might harm others, when that prospective harm 
100 Evelina Giobbe, Prostitution:  Buying the Right to Rape, in RAPE AND SEXUAL 
ASSAULT III 143, 143 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1991). 
101 Id. at 144. 
102 On one account of consent, what we might call a relational account, the use of 
force, threats, coercion, etc., by T against V in order to secure V ’s submission to sex 
with D does not vitiate V ’s consent to D, unless D actually knew—or at least sus-
pected—that V had submitted under such conditions.  If D is genuinely ignorant of the 
background conditions under which V submits, the argument goes, her consent re-
mains unaffected.  This account of consent strikes me as inconsistent with our best un-
derstanding of consent and instead captures cases in which V does not consent to D yet 
the question of whether D is culpable for his conduct remains to be determined by 
other considerations—for example, whether his ignorance was culpable.  If D’s ignor-
ance is culpable, then he is not to blame for inflicting this harm on V, yet he causes V 
harm nonetheless.  See Dempsey, supra note 48, at 448 n.24 (explaining my belief that 
“English rape law treats consent as a non-relational concept, whereby force employed 
by X can negate Y ’s consent to Z ” (italics added)).  My thanks to Andrew von Hirsch 
for pressing me on this point. 
103 Here, I follow Antony Duff’s helpful analysis.  See R.A. Duff, Criminalizing En-
dangerment, in DEFINING CRIMES 43, 51 (R.A. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2005).   
104 Id. 
105 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-6-24 (2006) (“A person commits the crime of reckless 
endangerment if he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of 
serious physical injury to another person.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-208 (2008) (simi-
lar); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-63 (West Supp. 2007) (similar); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 120.20 (McKinney 2009) (similar). 
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provides a conclusive reason against acting thus, we do wrong; we do 
wrong to those whom we thus endanger.”106 
Understood according to a theory of criminalization grounded in 
the argument from endangerment, the sort of offense I have in mind 
would be properly characterized as what Duff calls an “implicit en-
dangerment” offense.107  Duff correctly notes that some endangerment 
offenses (“explicit endangerment” offenses) are articulated in terms 
of elements that require proof that the actual risk at issue was posed.  
Examples include offenses such as dangerous driving and reckless en-
dangerment.108  Framed as an explicit endangerment offense, the pur-
chase of sex would be prohibited only in instances where the prosti-
tuted person actually had been subjected to background conditions that 
would vitiate her consent to the subsequent commercial sex act.109  In 
106 Duff, supra note 103, at 53.  Note, however, that the identification of wrongful 
harm would not, in itself, justify criminalizing the conduct.  Further considerations 
would have to be taken into account to do so.  Duff would add the further requirement 
that the conduct at issue be sufficiently public in nature, rather than address mere pri-
vate wrongdoing.  See id.  I shall assume here that the case of purchasing sex in the 
context of the prostitution industry as currently practiced is adequately public so as to 
meet Duff’s concerns.  In previous work, I have questioned the fruitfulness of employ-
ing the public/private dichotomy in this way.  See DEMPSEY, supra note 9, at 31-41.  The 
public/private dichotomy, particularly as applied in the context of violence against 
women, has long been a target of feminist critique.  See generally Anita L. Allen, Coercing 
Privacy, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 723 (1999) (offering a thoughtful treatment of these 
critiques and a reconstruction of the value of privacy). 
107 Duff, supra note 103, at 59 (characterizing an “implicit endangerment” offense 
as an offense whose definition contains no explicit reference to harm). 
108 Id. 
109 The recently adopted law in England is framed as an explicit endangerment 
offense (albeit a strict-liability one):    
(1) A person (A) commits an offence if—  
 (a) A makes or promises payment for the sexual services of a prostitute (B),  
 (b) a third person (C) has engaged in exploitative conduct of a kind likely 
to induce or encourage B to provide the sexual services for which A has made 
or promised payment, and  
 (c) C engaged in that conduct for or in the expectation of gain for C or 
another person (apart from A or B).  
(2) The following are irrelevant—  
 (a) where in the world the sexual services are to be provided and whether 
those services are provided,  
 (b) whether A is, or ought to be, aware that C has engaged in exploitative 
conduct.  
(3) C engages in exploitative conduct if—  
 (a) C uses force, threats (whether or not relating to violence) or any other 
form of coercion, or  
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those cases, the agreement to purchase sex poses an actual risk of 
harm to the nonconsenting prostituted person, namely, the risk that 
she will be subjected to a nonconsensual commercial sex act. 
The offense I have in mind, however, would not require actually 
posing a risk.  It would instead criminalize the purchase of sex in all 
instances as an “implicit endangerment” offense.  As Duff has ex-
plained, “[I]mplicit [endangerment] offences lay down rules that are 
intended to capture part of the content of the standards declared in 
the explicit offences.”110  They are, in other words, intended to identify 
the context in which the risk of harm is likely to materialize, without 
requiring that the harm in fact materialize in any given case.  Exam-
ples include driving with blood alcohol content in excess of a certain 
level, speeding, and impersonating a medical doctor or lawyer.111 
One important benefit to enacting the prohibition against buying 
sex in terms of an implicit, rather than an explicit, endangerment of-
fense is the tendency such a definition has to “promote certainty and 
consistency:  citizens can know what they may or may not do.”112  In-
deed, framed as an implicit endangerment offense, the goals of cer-
tainty and consistency are well served.  The prohibition is simple:  do 
not buy sex.  Compare this prohibition to the one that might be 
framed as an explicit endangerment offense:  do not buy sex from 
someone who has been forced, threatened, coerced, etc.113  The bene-
fits of certainty and consistency in this area are particularly acute giv-
en the deep and abiding conflicts in judging the borderline of con-
cepts such as consent, force, coercion, etc.  This point is well 
illustrated by one buyer who observed, 
 (b) C practises any form of deception.  
Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 53A (Eng.) (as amended by Policing and Crime Act, 
2009, c. 26, § 14 (Eng.)) (italics added).  As noted in the previous section, the English 
law seems to draw justification from both the argument from complicity and the argu-
ment from endangerment.  
110 Duff, supra note 103, at 60. 
111 Id. at 59; see also, e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2524 (West 2004) (making un-
authorized practice of law in Pennsylvania a misdemeanor); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. 
ANN. § 422.10 (West 2010) (prohibiting the unlicensed practice of medicine); 75 PA. 
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3362 (West 2006) (prohibiting driving in speed in excess of posted 
limits); 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3802 (West 2008) (prohibiting driving under the 
influence of drugs or alcohol in Pennsylvania). 
112 Duff, supra note 103, at 60. 
113 See, e.g., supra note 109 (quoting the Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c.42, § 53A 
(Eng.)). 
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The organized crime aspect does concern me.  I suppose that it’s more 
the worry of things like the illegal immigrants and women under duress.  
I think it’s that aspect of duress that sort of concerns me as much as any-
thing.  And it’s always a fine line, isn’t it, as to what counts as duress.
114
 
Moreover, the need for certainty in prohibiting the purchase of 
sex on grounds of endangerment is particularly pressing in light of 
the fact that buyers are often inept at gauging the genuineness of a 
prostituted person’s consent.  Rather than recognize possible signs of 
background conditions that might suggest that the prostituted person 
is not genuinely consenting, buyers are typically highly motivated “to 
construct some kind of fiction of mutuality around their encounters 
with prostitutes.”115  In other words, buyers are particularly likely to err 
on the side of sex, rather than on the side of caution.116  Thus, if it is 
indeed “always a fine line . . . as to what counts as duress”117—and, 
conversely, what counts as consent118—and if prostitute-users are 
prone to cognitive errors in judging where that fine line lies,119 then it 
is advisable to draw the line brightly by prohibiting the purchase of 
sex generally. 
Before considering objections to the argument from endanger-
ment, it is worth noting that this argument does not justify imposing 
significant punishment or harsh condemnation upon people who 
purchase sex.  As with the argument from complicity, the sorts of pe-
nalties envisioned under the argument from endangerment would be 
limited to fines, public service, or perhaps education regarding the 
harms of trafficking and prostitution.120 
114 SANDERS, supra note 71, at 54-55.  
115 O’Connell Davidson, supra note 78, at 209. 
116 A similar phenomenon occurs in cases of speeding and drunk driving.  It is 
possible that some people do not actually pose a risk, despite driving at high speeds or 
with an elevated blood alcohol content; yet, because “we are notoriously prone to ex-
aggerate our driving skills[,] and someone who is in a hurry, or who has already had a 
drink, is not well placed to decide whether he can drive safely at that speed, or after 
another drink,” it may be justifiable to adopt a general bright-line rule based on alco-
hol content rather than actual impairment.  Duff, supra note 103, at 61.   
117 SANDERS, supra note 71, at 54-55. 
118 On the converse relationship between duress and consent in the criminal law 
of rape, see generally Anne M. Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. REV. 1 (1998). 
119 See O’Connell Davidson, supra note 78, at 209-13 (describing the tendency of 
prostitute-users to view their sexual encounters as mutually enjoyable). 
120 On the topic of educating prostitute-users regarding the harms experienced by 
prostituted people, see generally Iris Yen, Of Vice and Men:  A New Approach to Eradicat-
ing Sex Trafficking by Reducing Male Demand Through Educational Programs and Abolitionist 
Legislation, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653 (2008). 
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Still, even if the proposed penalties are limited, does the argu-
ment from endangerment risk proving too much?  Is it possible to ex-
tend its logic to cover all instances of sexual conduct—commercial 
and noncommercial?  After all, in every instance of sexual conduct, 
there is some risk that one of the parties is not genuinely consenting.  
Given our limited ability to know with certainty whether our partners 
are genuinely consenting, are we not posing an unjustified risk of 
harming our partners each time we have sex?  In my opinion, the ar-
gument from endangerment does not extend so far.  Rather, I believe 
its scope is limited, by virtue of the comparative likelihood of noncon-
sent in each context.  Based on the plausible assumption that the like-
lihood that a prostituted person is not genuinely consenting to com-
mercial sex is greater than the likelihood that there is a lack of 
genuine consent in noncommercial sex, the distinction marks a sa-
lient place to draw the line and prevents the argument from endan-
germent from extending to noncommercial sex tout court. 
A final objection to the argument from endangerment might be 
launched from the perspective of those who freely choose to sell sex.  
In seeking to deter buyers from purchasing sex for fear of the risk that 
the person selling sex might not be genuinely consenting, are feminist 
abolitionists treating the sellers as if they were children?  As Julia 
O’Connell Davidson notes, “[F]emale sex workers at the top end of 
the commercial sex market have been telling [feminist abolitionists] 
that they wish to continue to do what they do.”121  If this is so, then 
who are we to tell them they cannot continue?  In response to this cri-
tique, feminist abolitionists can point first to the fact that nothing in 
their project supports prohibiting the sale of sex.  In a direct sense, we 
are not telling these women that they cannot continue to do what they 
wish to do—rather, we are simply attempting to discourage prostitute-
users from doing what they do.  Moreover, as noted above, feminist 
abolitionism need not even deny the possibility that some people who 
sell sex do so freely.  So, pace O’Connell Davidson, it is not the case 
that feminist abolitionism “ignor[es]” the fact that these women “wish 
to continue to do what they do.”122  Rather, the point of the argument 
from endangerment is simply that there are many prostituted women 
who do not freely choose to sell sex; that buyers are not in a good epis-
temic or motivational position to judge which women are freely choos-
ing and which are not; and that the risk of harm posed to the noncon-
121 O’Connell Davidson, supra note 6, at 61. 
122 Id. 
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senting prostituted women vastly outweighs the benefits realized by 
freely choosing prostituted women.  In other words, the feminist-
abolitionist response to the woman who freely chooses to sell sex is 
not to deny that she exists or to treat her as a child; it is instead to say 
that her choice to sell sex does not justify the risk of harm posed to 
other prostituted people who are sold against their will. 
IV.  DEFENDING FEMINIST ABOLITIONISM 
A.  Does Feminist Abolitionism Support Policing Morality? 
The above arguments provided a rational basis for criminalizing 
the purchase of sex on two alternative grounds:  (1) that the market 
dynamics of purchasing sex render buyers complicit in the harm pros-
tituted people suffer at the hands of traffickers and abusive pimps; 
and (2) that buying sex constitutes endangerment insofar as prosti-
tute-use poses a risk of causing direct harm to prostituted people who 
have not genuinely consented to the commercial sexual act.  Both ar-
guments are grounded on the link between buying sex and the harms 
suffered by prostituted people.  As such, both arguments are funda-
mentally harm-based arguments. 
Of course, it is also the case that it is morally wrong to engage in 
conduct that renders one complicit in the harms inflicted on prosti-
tuted people or that directly risks inflicting such harms; indeed, it may 
very well be morally wrong to purchase sex for reasons that have little 
or nothing to do with the harms to prostituted people.123  Yet, while all 
this is true, it is crucial to note the distinctions between these lines of 
thought and the arguments developed in Part III, for neither argu-
ment offered above in support of criminalizing the purchase of sex 
rests solely on the morally wrongful quality of this conduct.  In other 
words, the arguments developed above are not arguments in favor of 
morals-based legislation; they do not call for the criminalization of 
buying sex simply on the grounds that buying sex is morally wrong.  
Instead, they are harm-based arguments calling for the criminalization 
of buying sex because such a purchase causes harm to others.124  There 
123 The anticommodification literature, for example, has developed strong argu-
ments against buying sex that do not depend on the harms caused to prostituted 
people.  See RADIN, supra note 13, at 131-36 (considering commodification and prosti-
tution).  
124 That buying sex is morally wrong operates as a side constraint to its justifiable 
criminalization, but it does not itself justify the criminal sanction.  For insightful argu-
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are, of course, arguments that can be offered in favor of criminalizing 
the purchase of sex solely on grounds of its moral wrongfulness, or on 
the ground that such conduct causes harm to someone or something 
other than prostituted people,125 but those are not the arguments un-
der consideration here.  Rather, the point of criminalizing the pur-
chase of sex, according to the argument from complicity and the ar-
gument from endangerment, is to prevent harm to others, specifically, 
to prostituted people.126 
B.  Is a Blanket Prohibition on the Purchase of Sex Unduly Broad? 
Ronald Weitzer has accused feminist abolitionism of casting too 
wide a net in its calls to criminalize the purchase of all sex.  The better 
option, he argues, is to limit our condemnation to the most harmful 
segments of the commercial sex industry, such as street prostitution.127  
Feminist-abolitionist groups, he claims, “can be criticized for . . . 
fail[ing] to draw important distinctions between different types of 
prostitutes.”128  This failure, he claims, is grounded in feminist aboli-
ments in favor of limiting the scope of criminalization to wrongful conduct, see HU-
SAK, supra note 66, at 66. 
125 It is commonly thought that the arguments famously put forth by Lord Devlin 
in PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS 14-15 (1959), would, if sound, jus-
tify criminalizing prostitution on moral grounds alone.  Yet Devlin’s arguments are 
better understood as at least quasi-harm-based, insofar as he was concerned about the 
harm of societal disintegration through a lack of shared positive morality.  See Gerald 
Dworkin, Devlin Was Right:  Law and the Enforcement of Morality, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
927, 931 (1999) (noting Devlin’s “equation of immorality with treason and his advoca-
cy of the right of any state to defend against . . . the harm that would occur if the actual 
moral code of a society were allowed to be attacked and weakened”).  Modern scholars 
have also supported morals-based legislation.  See, e.g., ROBERT P. GEORGE, MAKING 
MEN MORAL:  CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PUBLIC MORALITY 47 (1993) (“[L]aws that effective-
ly uphold public morality may contribute significantly to the common good of any 
community . . . .”); see also Thomas Søbirk Petersen, New Legal Moralism:  Some Strengths 
and Challenges, 4 CRIM. L. & PHIL. (forthcoming June 2010) (examining arguments for 
and against the new legal moralism).   
126 There are myriad other harm- or nuisance-based arguments that have been of-
fered in support of criminalizing prostitution across the board.  See, e.g., Ronald Weitz-
er, The Politics of Prostitution in America (describing grievances articulated by neighbor-
hood campaigns against prostitution, including harassment of women, costs to 
merchants, and neighborhood decline), in SEX FOR SALE 159, 166-70 (Ronald Weitzer 
ed., 2000). 
127 See id. at 170 (“Commercial sex in private appears to be acceptable [to the pub-
lic at large], as long as it has no spillover effects in the public arena.”); Ronald Weitzer, 
Flawed Theory and Method in Studies of Prostitution, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 934, 
945 (2005) (arguing that street prostitutes are more vulnerable to violence than 
prostitutes in indoor settings).  
128 Weitzer, supra note 126, at 174. 
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tionists’ embrace of “the radical feminist line on prostitution (seeing 
it as inherently oppressive and demeaning).”129  Yet, as I hope the ar-
gument from complicity and the argument from endangerment have 
demonstrated, it is possible to build a harm-based argument against 
the purchase of sex without endorsing the idea that all prostitution is 
harmful (or oppressive, demeaning, etc.).  The question then be-
comes whether it is possible to carve out an exception for certain types 
of prostitution—to hold that buying sex in certain contexts is permiss-
ible, while in other (more harmful) contexts, it is not.  To do so, we 
would have to be confident that such distinctions can be made.  Yet, as 
Melissa Farley has demonstrated, it is naïve to believe we can neatly 
separate different segments of the prostitution market.130 
Moreover, the proposal to carve out an exception for certain types 
of prostitution ignores the logic of the argument from complicity.  
According to that argument, the buyer is responsible for causing 
harms to prostituted women not because he directly inflicts the harm 
through his act of prostitute-use, but because his purchase of sex ge-
nerates demand for the commercial sex market, which thereby encou-
rages the trafficking and abusive pimping that often supplies this 
market.  Thus, even if it were possible to identify a segment of the 
prostitution market in which buyers did not directly inflict harm on 
prostituted people, it would have to be established that the buyers’ 
market demand did not encourage trafficking and abusive pimping in 
other market segments.  If it were possible to segment the prostitution 
market and if demand in elite prostitution did not contribute to mar-
ket growth in more problematic market segments, then the objection 
from overbreadth would hit its mark.  The feminist-abolitionist re-
sponse, however, is that neither “if” reflects a plausible account of the 
market dynamics of prostitution as currently practiced.131 
129 Id.  For objections to Weitzer’s interpretation of feminist arguments regarding 
prostitution, see supra text accompanying notes 51-60. 
130 See Melissa Farley, Prostitution Harms Women Even If Indoors:  Reply to Weitzer, 11 
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 950, 955 (2005) (“In practice, indoor prostitution 
increases the trick’s safety, but it does nothing to decrease psychological trauma for 
the prostituted woman.  The social invisibility of indoor prostitution may actually 
increase its danger.”). 
131 See Richard Poulin, The Legalization of Prostitution and Its Impact on Traffick-
ing in Women and Children, http://sisyphe.org/spip.php?article1596 (last visited Apr. 
15, 2010) (arguing that “the legalization of prostitution . . . generates a colossal expan-
sion of [the prostitution] industry and of the trafficking which is its corollary”); see also 
MARY SULLIVAN, COAL. AGAINST TRAFFICKING IN WOMEN, WHAT HAPPENS WHEN PROS-
TITUTION BECOMES WORK?  AN UPDATE ON LEGALISATION OF PROSTITUTION IN AUS-
TRALIA 14-16 (2005), http://action.web.ca/home/catw/attach/Sullivan_proof_01.pdf 
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C.  Will Criminalizing the Purchase of Sex Actually  
Reduce Harm to Prostituted People? 
The arguments above support criminalizing the purchase of sex on 
grounds that buying sex harms prostituted people.  In order for crimi-
nal laws prohibiting the purchase of sex to be justifiable, it may be 
thought necessary for criminalization to have the opposite effect and 
actually reduce harm to prostituted people.132  If the laws are ineffective 
in reducing harm to prostituted people, or worse yet, if they have the 
unintended consequence of increasing those harms, they will not be 
justifiable.133  This argument is not limited to the realm of prostitution.  
Any use of the criminal law may generate unintended consequences, 
and optimistic reformers must remain vigilant to this possibility.134 
In the context of prostitution debates, there are three issues that 
are worth separating regarding the likely impact of criminalizing the 
purchase of sex:  First, whether criminalizing the purchase of sex de-
ters men from buying sex.  Second, whether prostituted women will 
suffer fewer harms if men are deterred from buying sex.  Finally, 
(discussing the increase in illegal trafficking accompanying the expansion of the lega-
lized prostitution markets in Australia). 
132 There is, however, some debate in criminal law theory regarding this matter.  
In a traditional interpretation of Mill’s harm principle, the fact that a person’s conduct 
causes harm to others is a good reason in favor of criminalizing that conduct.  See 1 
FEINBERG, supra note 10, at 11 (“John Stuart Mill argued in effect that the harm prin-
ciple is the only valid principle for determining legitimate invasions of liberty . . . .”).  
In a more recent reinterpretation of the harm principle, though, “it is the harm pre-
vented by the law, rather than the harm done by the criminal offence, that matters in 
determining whether the principle was satisfied.”  John Gardner, Book Review, NOTRE 
DAME PHIL. REV., Aug. 3, 2008, http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=13805 (reviewing 
HUSAK, supra note 66).  In some respects, the latter interpretation allows for a wider 
scope of criminalization, insofar as it allows for criminalization of conduct that is not 
itself harmful.  (For criticism of this latter interpretation, see HUSAK, supra note 66, at 
72.)  In other respects, however, the latter interpretation of the harm principle re-
stricts the scope of justifiable criminalization, for the law must actually reduce the 
harm that it is intended to reduce and must “do so in a way that is proportionate to the 
harm actually prevented.”  Gardner, supra. 
133 In other words, I am accepting the limitations imposed by both the traditional 
and more recent interpretations of the harm principle discussed supra note 132.  
134 As John Gardner observes,  
[L]egislators often assume that criminalizing an activity tends to reduce its in-
cidence, or at least tends to eradicate its worst excesses.  They ignore the reali-
ty that banning an activity often drives it underground where it become[s] 
more profitable (and hence more attractive to appalling people) as well as 
harder to supervise (and hence more appalling).  
Gardner, supra note 132. 
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whether, if men were criminalized for purchasing sex but did so none-
theless, that would increase the harm to prostituted women. 
On the first issue, opinion is split.  The most pessimistic voices in 
this debate conclude that criminalization will not only fail to deter but 
that it may increase demand among men for whom the risk of buying 
sex is an “erotic factor.”135  Research based on interviews with men who 
buy sex, however, provides a far more optimistic view of the likely de-
terrent effect of criminalization.  Indeed, empirical research regard-
ing demand for prostitution has found that there are a number of 
equally effective means of deterring men from buying sex, including 
the use of criminal penalties.136  The effect of the Swedish law is cur-
rently being evaluated by the Swedish government,137 but early signs 
indicate that it has deterred the purchase of sex, resulting in a reduc-
tion of trafficking and street prostitution.138 
Regarding the second issue, it is important to recall that the fe-
minist-abolitionist project is not solely about criminalizing the pur-
chase of sex.  It would be naïve to think that criminalization of buyers, 
standing alone, will have the desired effect of reducing harm to prosti-
tuted women.  Rather, the criminalization of the purchase of sex is 
one part of a broader project that includes the provision of social wel-
fare to prostituted people as a key component.  Early reports suggest 
that the provision of these resources, in combination with the crimina-
lization of buyers, has had a positive impact on the welfare of prosti-
135 BELINDA BROOKS-GORDON, THE PRICE OF SEX 259 (2006).  Curiously, Brooks-
Gordon fails to cite any evidence in support of this claim. 
136 See RACHEL DURCHSLAG & SAMIR GOSWAMI, CHI. ALLIANCE AGAINST SEXUAL 
EXPLOITATION, DECONSTRUCTING THE DEMAND FOR PROSTITUTION:  PRELIMINARY IN-
SIGHTS FROM INTERVIEWS WITH CHICAGO MEN WHO PURCHASE SEX 3 (Ruth Durchslag 
et al. eds., 2008), available at http://www.caase.org/pdf/resources/17-deconstructing-
the-demand-for-prostitution.pdf (reporting on the results of a study in which eighty-
three percent of men interviewed stated that the threat of jail time would deter them 
from purchasing sex); MACLEOD ET AL., supra note 70, at 26-28 (explaining that the 
most effective deterrents were, not surprisingly, the most condemnatory and shaming 
penalties, such as being added to a sex offender registry; having their picture or name 
on a billboard, local newspaper, or the Internet; or having to spend time in jail). 
137 See, e.g., Sweden to Evaluate Effects of Prostitution Law, LOCAL, Apr. 24, 2008, 
http://www.thelocal.se/11322/20080424 (describing the Swedish inquiry into the ef-
fects of Sweden’s ban on prostitution). 
138 See JULIE BINDEL & LIZ KELLY, LONDON METRO. UNIV., A CRITICAL EXAMINA-
TION OF RESPONSES TO PROSTITUTION IN FOUR COUNTRIES:  VICTORIA, AUSTRALIA; 
IRELAND; THE NETHERLANDS; AND SWEDEN 72-79 (2003) (reporting increasing public 
support, a significant decrease in street prostitution, and a decrease in Sweden’s attrac-
tiveness to traffickers); Ekberg, supra note 2, at 1193, 1199 (noting a decrease in the 
incidence of street prostitution and a positive effect in reducing trafficking). 
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tuted women in Sweden.139  Of course, it should come as no surprise 
that the provision of social welfare has a harm-reduction effect.  The 
real issue is whether criminalizing buyers enhances this effect—can 
the harm-reduction effect of the Swedish model be achieved without 
criminalizing the purchase of sex?  If so, then the feminist-abolitionist 
arguments fail to justify penalizing buyers.  Yet, insofar as the two as-
pects of the feminist-abolitionist project are mutually reinforcing—
providing a “holistic approach to the problems of prostitution”140—
there remain good reasons to criminalize the purchase of sex along-
side the provision of social welfare to prostituted people. 
The third issue highlights the greatest problem confronting fe-
minist abolitionism:  the risk of unintended consequences.141  Is it 
possible that criminalizing the purchase of sex will not only fail to de-
ter but will in fact make things worse for prostituted women?142  One 
139 See BINDEL & KELLY, supra note 138, at 78 (noting a marked decrease in prosti-
tution-related violence since the passage of Sweden’s law). 
140 Id. at 25. 
141 Victoria Nourse puts the point well:  “Feminist reforms have a kind of built-in, 
albeit unpredictable, capacity for failure; like the apple harboring the worm, they har-
bor the possibility of their own undoing.”  Victoria Nourse, The “Normal” Successes and 
Failures of Feminism and the Criminal Law, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 951, 953 (2000).  For this 
reason, Aya Gruber is correct to counsel caution in using progressive feminist reforms 
to address violence against women, for, as she notes, “[e]ven ‘progressive’ criminal re-
forms rest on the assumption that proper education of state actors will enable the 
criminal system to empower rather than subordinate minorities. . . . [H]owever well-
intentioned, most criminal law reforms end up becoming yet another procedural ve-
hicle for warehousing the worst off.”  Aya Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 741, 822-23 (2007) (footnote omitted).  Yet, as Nourse points out, “[t]his does not 
mean that reform is futile, but it may simply mean that reform demands perpetual vi-
gilance.”  Nourse, supra, at 978. 
142 The unintended consequences of criminalizing the purchase of sex include the 
harms that may be suffered disproportionately by men who are already socially disem-
powered.  Given the negative uses of criminal law throughout history and still today, 
such as racist law-enforcement policies, there is reason to resist using the criminal law 
as a tool for positive social change.  See generally MICHAEL TONRY, MALIGN NEGLECT—
RACE, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1995) (discussing the disparate impact 
crime-control policies can have on disadvantaged communities); Angela J. Davis, Be-
nign Neglect of Racism in the Criminal Justice System, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1660, 1663 (1996) 
(reviewing TONRY, supra) (discussing racial discrimination within the criminal justice 
system).  Since racism is fundamentally inconsistent with feminist commitments to ab-
olish all wrongful structural inequalities, feminists should resist any reforms that will 
tend to exacerbate racism.  See DEMPSEY, supra note 9, at 129-35.  This risk of unin-
tended consequences poses a serious objection to feminist abolitionism.  Yet, it is im-
portant to bear in mind that feminist-abolitionist reforms like the Swedish model, if 
adopted in the United States, would not expand the criminal law’s power; it would re-
duce it.  At present, in most jurisdictions throughout the United States, both sellers 
and buyers are criminalized.  Feminist abolitionist reforms would therefore restrict the 
power of the criminal law by decriminalizing people who sell sex.  Thus, to the extent 
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obvious way this problem might arise is through a reduction of street 
prostitution and a corresponding rise in indoor prostitution. The ef-
fect of criminalizing the purchase of sex may be that prostitution is 
driven indoors, where its “social invisibility . . . may actually increase its 
danger.”143 
The risk of unintended consequences is a serious concern for the 
feminist-abolitionist project.  Even if criminalization has the desired 
deterrent effect on potential buyers (thereby reducing the overall 
amount of trafficking, abusive pimping, and infliction of harm 
through prostitute-use), it is unlikely that complete abolition will ever 
be achieved.  Thus, even while the overall amount of harm to prosti-
tuted people is reduced, those who are unable to exit may be sub-
jected to even greater harm.  Of course, the risk of increased harm to 
a relatively smaller number of people does not in itself defeat the fe-
minist abolitionists’ argument; it does, however, starkly illustrate the 
cost of the proposed criminal law reforms.  While these costs must be 
kept in mind, it is crucial to recall that the goal of criminalization is 
not simply a short-term readjustment of the costs and benefits of pros-
titution.144  Rather, the goal of the feminist-abolitionist project is a 
long-term transformation to a post-patriarchal society:  one in which 
prostitution likely would not exist at all, and if it did, would represent 
one of a range of valuable options available to all people.145 
that current criminal laws are being used in racist and other problematic ways (e.g., by 
targeting disempowered women of color who sell sex, while allowing relatively power-
ful middle-class white men to go free), the proposed reforms would improve the crim-
inal justice system by limiting its scope. 
143 Farley, supra note 130, at 955. 
144 See Nourse, supra note 141, at 978 (“Statutory reform rarely ends anything.  It 
may transform the debate, yet it would be naïve to believe that it could ‘end’ a matter 
as ancient as sexism.  This does not mean that reform is futile, but it may simply mean 
that reform demands perpetual vigilance.”).   
145 It is difficult, of course, to know whether this long-term goal will be achieved, 
particularly in light of the fact that there has never been a widespread adoption of the 
feminist abolitionist program.  If, in the end, abolition does more good than harm, 
then this consideration lends further support to my argument.  While abolitionists 
adopt an optimistic stance toward unknown contingencies (perhaps to the point of 
being, as Gloria Steinem puts it, “hopeaholics”), nonabolitionists remain rather more 
pessimistic.  Gloria Steinem, I’m a Hopeaholic.  There’s Nothing George Bush Can Do About 
It, GUARDIAN (London), Sept. 13, 2005, at 28.  For insightful reflection on the difficul-
ties of securing reliable data regarding prostitution and sex trafficking, see Hila Sha-
mir’s discussion in Halley et al., supra note 6, at 405-06. 
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D.  Is Criminalization Antithetical to Feminism? 
Feminists have—or at least should have—a healthy skepticism 
about using the criminal law to achieve feminist goals.146  Ultimately, 
criminalization is about the enforcement of norms under threat of 
force.  While criminalization does not always involve the actual use of 
physical violence, the threat of violence is always lurking in the back-
ground of any criminal prohibition.  After all, criminal prohibitions 
are not merely suggestions for good conduct being offered by the 
state.  Rather, they are directives by which the state claims authority 
over its subjects—and they are backed by the threat and often the use 
of violence. 
There is, therefore, something ironic and troubling about femin-
ist abolitionism’s proposal to fight violence against women by using 
the criminal law with its implicit threat or explicit use of violence.147  
This objection, however, ignores three crucial points regarding the 
power of the state to impose criminal sanctions as it relates to the fe-
minist-abolitionist project.  First, as a general matter, in societies 
where the state holds a monopoly on power and wields that power 
through the criminal law, those who wish to effect positive social 
change disengage from the state and its criminal law at their peril.  In 
other words, ignoring the state’s power will not make it go away.  
Second, it is important to note that feminist abolitionism’s call to cri-
minalize buying sex is not, in most jurisdictions, a call for an expansion 
of the criminal law.  In most states throughout the United States and 
under federal law, it is already a crime to buy sex.  Thus, no new laws 
would have to be passed against buying sex.  Feminist abolitionists are 
simply calling upon societies and their legal officials to rethink the ra-
tionale for these prohibitions and to enforce the laws in a way that is 
146 See, e.g., BUMILLER, supra note 39, at 2 (acknowledging the importance of re-
cognizing “the limitations of using state power to advance the interests of women”); 
Halley et al., supra note 6, at 337-40 (discussing the limitations of the criminal law in 
effectively combating the abuses feminists seek to eliminate and criticizing those who 
imagine criminalization to be a perfect solution to such abuses); Nourse, supra note 
141, at 977-78 (concluding, from an analysis of particular feminist reforms of criminal 
law, that often such reforms are less effective than feminists would hope because “[s]ocial 
norms of inequality have tended to perpetuate themselves in the criminal law”).  
147 See Halley et al., supra note 6, at 341 (“It is very odd, then, to see across the 
range of [feminist] projects . . . a strong trend to advocate . . . very state-centered, top-
down, sovereigntist feminist rule preferences [emphasizing criminal enforcement].”).  
For additional consideration of reasons why feminist abolitionism should be wary of ex-
panding the scope of criminal law, see supra note 141 and accompanying text.  See also 
Halley et al., supra note 6, at 337 (expressing concern regarding the exercise of discretion 
and interpretation of injustices in the administration of the criminal justice system). 
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consistent with the understanding that their justification lies in the 
links between buying sex and harms suffered by prostituted people.  
Finally, it is also the case that in most states throughout the United 
States and under federal law, it is already a crime not only to buy sex 
but also to sell sex.  Under feminist reforms, laws penalizing the sale of 
sex would be abolished, thereby restricting the scope of the criminal 
law.  Thus, at least with respect to jurisdictions in which both sale and 
purchase are presently criminalized, feminist abolitionism advocates 
reigning in the power of the criminal law. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has attempted to explain and defend a feminist-
abolitionist response to sex trafficking and prostitution.  It has ex-
amined some common critiques of feminist abolitionism:  that it 
equates all prostitution with violence against women; that it denies the 
possibility of freely choosing to sell sex; that it is “in bed” with the 
right wing; and that it seeks to impose moral laws rather than recog-
nize the autonomy of women who sell sex.  By tackling these critiques 
and, notably, conceding the possibility that some women do freely 
choose to sell sex, this Article has launched a new path for under-
standing and defending feminist-abolitionist arguments.  The argu-
ments developed herein illustrate that feminist abolitionism’s call to 
criminalize the purchase of sex can be justified by reference to the 
harms suffered by prostituted women, without maintaining that these 
harms are an inevitable or necessary component of prostitution. 
The defense of feminist abolitionism developed herein has not, 
however, been unqualified.  The arguments made regarding complici-
ty and endangerment would not justify a harshly punitive or condem-
natory response to the purchase of sex.  Moreover, with respect to the 
issue of criminalization, the risk of unintended consequences was 
identified as a crucial consideration that might very well limit the 
force of the feminist-abolitionist argument in jurisdictions where buy-
ing sex is not already criminalized.  However, such considerations 
pack considerably less punch in jurisdictions like many throughout 
the United States where both buying and selling sex are currently 
prohibited.148 
The take-home message of this Article is twofold.  First, the pur-
chase of sex can be justifiably criminalized on grounds of the harm it 
148 See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
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causes to prostituted people, even if it is the case that some prostitu-
tion is not harmful.  Second, in jurisdictions like many throughout the 
United States, there are good reasons for us to rethink our rationale 
for criminalizing prostitution, to adopt a feminist-abolitionist frame-
work that justifies criminalization of the purchase of sex on grounds 
of its harm to prostituted people, and to abolish laws that criminalize 
the sale of sex. 
 
 
